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I. INTRODUCTION
As Americans, we commonly assume that the world takes
lessons from us—or at least that the world fancies observing us as
much as De Tocqueville did in the 19th century. I believe that the
reverse works just as well, if not better, and that, indeed, it is our
responsibility to learn from the experiences of other nations. In
my case, observing the experience(s) of the Maori—the indigenous
population of New Zealand—teaches me much about the civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights of indigenous
populations and urban persons of color, as well as about the state
of democracy in a neo-liberal, global economy. Without presuming
to be like De Tocqueville in any way, I will share here what I have
learned from a year-long stay in 1999 in hopes of reinvigorating our
own post-civil rights movement—which at its heart is the struggle to
construct a more just and equitable multiracial democracy.
I must preface my remarks, however, by admitting a few things.
First, I am a civil rights attorney only in so far as is demanded of me
at the Institute on Race & Poverty at the University of Minnesota
Law School in the fight against racial and economic injustice.
Therefore, when I refer to “the cause” I am speaking in a very
broad sense about the equalization of opportunities for persons of
color, not only in terms of civil rights, but also in terms of full
participation in the democratic process. Second, I am far more
informed about the plight of urban persons of color than I am
about that of indigenous persons—especially in rural areas.
However, the cumulative effects of institutional racism and
concentrated poverty affect both populations, especially where the
populations intersect, as is the case with urban Maori. And last, I
am admitting ahead of time that I capture only as much of Maori
experience(s) as I can as a visitor and as a Pakeha or “person of
2
predominantly European descent.”
In the main part of the article, after an overview of race and
identity in New Zealand, I will locate Maori experience(s) within
two general contexts—namely in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi
and in reaction to the recent neo-liberal economic reform.
2. H.W. WILLIAMS, A DICTIONARY OF THE MAORI LANGUAGE 252 (1975). All
further translations will be drawn from this source. To pronounce Maori words,
use the following sounds: a = ah, as in “pa”; e = ay, as in “day”; i = ee, as in “fee”; o
= oh, as in “no”; and u = oo, as in “too.” The “ng” sound resembles the “ng” sound
in “tongue. The “wh” sound is commonly pronounced as “f.” The “r” sound is
rolled off the tongue, not formed in the throat.
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Examining the Treaty—with its much-debated notion of
rangatiratanga (self determination/sovereignty)—will require an
exploration of political and civil rights. Examining the neo-liberal
reform, in turn, will require a closer look at economic and social
rights. In the second part of the article, I will attempt to discern
several patterns that emerge with which to implicate our own cause.
II. MAORI EXPERIENCE(S) IN CONTEXT
A. A Brief Overview of Race and Identity
1. Contemporary Inter- and Intra-racial Tensions
We cannot sleepwalk to the goal of a racially harmonious
3
society.
— Dr. Rajen Prasad, Race Relations Conciliator, New Zealand
Guidebooks commonly promote New Zealand as “a country of
racial harmony” with “a renewed interest in Maoritanga (Maori way
4
5
of life)” and a “high standard of living.” As would be expected,
this depiction is incomplete. The relationships within the nation
are far more complex and contentious and the standard of living
far more racialized.
According to the 1996 census, New Zealand’s 3.68 million
population includes approximately 14% Maori, 10% Asian, 6%
6
7
Pacific Islanders, and 70% Pakeha. As in the United States,
however, the racial and ethnic makeup of the population will
3. Karen Burge, Major Changes to Cultural Landscape by Mid-century, N.Z.
HERALD, March 22, 1999, at A3.
4. JANE KING, NEW ZEALAND HANDBOOK 13 (1990).
5. Id. at 16.
6. Pacific Islanders have been in New Zealand for more than 100 years, with
migration increasing rapidly in the 1960s. Id. They currently make up almost 6%
of the population and include Samoans, Tongans, Fijians, Cook Islanders,
Tokelauans, and Niueans. Id. at 3. They are diverse in culture and language, but
share common migration and assimilation history. Id. at 8. MINISTRY OF PACIFIC
ISLAND AFFAIRS, NAVIGATING THE CURRENTS OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM: A SPECIAL
REPORT 8 (1999)(discussing the changing familial and societal structures of Pacific
peoples in New Zealand)[hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT].
7. MASON DURIE, TE MANA, TE KAWANATANGA: THE POLITICS OF MAORI SELFDETERMINATION 86 (1998). Forty percent of Maori are under the age of 15. Id.
Elderly Maori will increase from 3% in 1991 to 13% in 2031. Id. Elderly will likely
be less familiar with customs and culture and unable to count on consistent
whanau (family) support. Id.
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change dramatically in the near future. By 2046, the proportion of
Pakeha will drop to only half the population at around 2.5 million.
Maori population will almost double and Asian and Pacific Islander
8
more than triple.
The relationship between Pakeha and Maori receives the lion’s
share of attention—largely due to the historic nature of colonizer
and colonized. Whether this relationship is a positive one is
contended. One Pakeha scholar, Peter Munz, believes that all is
well in New Zealand because Maori are geographically mixed with
Pakeha and not locked in reservations “with food and beer” like the
9
“Red Indians”, or trapped in homelands like the South Africans.
But Ella Henry, a Maori of Nga Puhi, argues that there is little
evidence the two races are coming together. “What Pakeha fail to
understand,” says Henry, “is that they get on with Maori because
Maori have made the effort . . . Pakeha cannot accept that the
sacrifice made by Maori has robbed us of our personal identity and
mana (honor). If the tension is not obvious it is because we have
10
been trying so hard to be like them . . . .”
Assimilation of Maori into Pakeha ways appears to be the
11
norm. As one Pakeha former Race Relations Conciliator admits,
“the power of the numbers and the overwhelming weight of
western culture combine to make for an irresistible one way flow of
cultural traffic. . . . Consciously and unconsciously we have been
folding the culture of the Maori into what we regarded as better for
12
all.” Indeed, when the English settlers carved out their territories
they displayed a “wonderfully cavalier disregard of the . . . local
terrain” instead drawing “an orderly, linear, culturally
straightjacketed response . . . antithetical to the endlessly curving,
13
flowing line of Maori design.” Munz argues that assimilation is
the “essence of human history” and cannot be prevented. He
8. Burge, supra note 3, at A3.
9. CAROL ARCHIE, MAORI SOVEREIGNTY: THE PAKEHA PERSPECTIVE 99 (1995).
10. HINEANI MELBOURNE, MAORI SOVEREIGNTY: THE MAORI PERSPECTIVE 22
(1995). Henry even believes that groundwork has been set for gang warfare and
civil disturbance. Id.
11. CHRIS LAIDLAW, RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: BEYOND THE NEW ZEALAND IDENTITY
CRISIS 160 (1999).
12. Id. at 159. One prominent Pakeha captures the essence of this subjugation
when he claims, “[a]ll people may be of equal value; but, although we should
respect the good in all cultures, we cannot say that Maori and European
contributions to civilization are equal.” DAVID ROUND, TRUTH OR TREATY: COMMON
SENSE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 79 (1998).
13. LAIDLAW, supra note 11, at 26.
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claims that no ethnic identity lasts very long, including Maori.
Economic subjugation of Maori accompanies this assimilative
process. Maori (as well as the Pacific Islanders) experience among
the lowest income levels; the highest rates of unemployment and
single-parent families; the poorest health; the lowest educational
enrollment and achievement; and the highest representation in
subsidized housing, government-funded income support, and the
15
criminal justice system. As Waireti Walters, a health worker, puts
it, “Here we are as Maori in our own country and we are still
begging under the table to the white man. We always seem to be
16
deprived or second class.”
Some Pakeha, lamenting the preferential treatment Maori
sometimes receive to compensate for this subjugation, claim that
17
Maori “simply can’t hack it on a level playing field.” Many even
complain of positive discrimination to the Race Relations Office.
According to the 1999 Race Relations Conciliator, Dr. Rajen
18
Prasad, the level of discomfort among non-Maori is increasing. It
appears that “biculturalism” for Pakeha is “no more than a limited
19
indulgence; but for the Maori it is a matter of survival.”
Survival is particularly daunting for urban Maori. Prior to
World War II, 90% of Maori lived in rural areas and predominantly
within their iwi (tribal) domains. After an economic boom, labor
20
demands increased in urban areas drawing Maori in. Currently,
80% of Maori live in the main urban centers, with about 25% in
21
Auckland alone. As anthropologist Steven Webster notes,
14. ARCHIE, supra note 9, at 94. Munz is Professor Emeritus of History at
Victoria University. Id. at 93. Munz goes on to say, “[s]ome Maori think they came
here ready-made in canoes. But they didn’t.” Id. at 96.
15. SPECIAL REPORT supra note 6, at 8.
16. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 57. Often Maori are not even welcome at
the table, as was evident during my stay, for example, in Howick, a suburb of
Auckland where Pakeha were trying to keep Maori out of the area and prevent
them from establishing a marae (meeting house). See Scott Kara, Marae Word a
Canker in Garden of Memories, N.Z. HERALD, Dec. 4-5, 1999, at A4.
17. Frank Haden, It’s An Unlevel Playing Field at the 2000 Maori Olympics, SUN.
STAR TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999, at C4.
18. Jenny Forsyth, Changing Face of Race Complaints, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 27,
1999, at A13.
19. LAIDLAW, supra note 11, at 159.
20. Paul Meredith, Urban Maori as “New Citizens”: The Quest for
Recognition and Resources, Paper Presented to the Revisioning Citizenship in
New Zealand Conference 2-3 (Feb. 22-24, 2000) available at Te Matahauariki
Institute, http://www.lianz.waikato.ac.nz/.
21. DURIE, supra note 7, at 86. This would include areas of 30,000 or more
such as Auckland and Hamilton. Id. Because of unemployment, however, there is
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“[I]mmigrant ‘others’ are tolerated primarily because their labour
is used to build industries . . . [or] they are not tolerated and must
22
live. . . apart from the [Pakeha].” He goes on to say that “the
persistent myth that [Maori] are a ‘rural’ people only recently
having ‘drifted’ to the cities entrenches their status as ‘immigrants’
23
in their own home.”
Because of increasing urban migration, the initial housing
policy of “pepper-potting”—dispersing Maori families throughout
urban centers—was superceded by that of allocating Maori to state24
built homes in large housing estates.
The resulting racial
polarization is particularly evident in Auckland, where affluent
coastal and inner-city suburbs are dominated by aging Pakeha and
less affluent areas by ethnic minorities and families with young
children. Within ten years, only half of all Auckland residents will
be Pakeha. Urban renewal strategies have neither stemmed this
white flight nor provided the appropriate mix of housing options
needed to avoid increased crime, health problems, and antisocial
25
behavior in high-density, low-income areas.
As a result, a
widening income gap and rising housing prices are producing a
26
metropolitan community of “haves” and “have-nots.”
Urban Maori also have to contend with living apart from and
in tension with rural iwi (tribes). At least 70% of all Maori live
outside their tribal rohe (boundaries) and approximately one-third
27
live without any tribal influence at all. This urbanization process
has led to cultural losses, disenfranchisement of urban Maori from
their tribal land and origins, and socio-economic difficulties,
28
especially without whanau (kin) to fall back on. Although “iwi”
traditionally meant “the people”, its current “tribal” meaning has
empowered rural iwi elders to further ghettoize urban Maori and
a trend toward migration back to tribal areas such as the Northland. Id. Also,
some 26,000 Maori are recorded living in Australia. Id.
22. STEVEN WEBSTER, PATRONS OF MAORI CULTURE: POWER, THEORY AND
IDEOLOGY IN THE MAORI RENAISSANCE 11 (University of Otgao Press 1998)
23. Id.
24. Meredith, supra note 20, at 3.
25. Geoff Cumming & Scott Kara, Planning Vital to Avoid Slums: High-Density
Housing Can Have its Pitfalls, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 24, 1999, at A7.
26. Geoff Cumming, Ethnic Melting Pot on the Way, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 18,
1999, at A8. “By 2021 the region will house 1.5 million people, 34% of New
Zealand’s population.” Id.
27. Meredith, supra note 20, at 17-18. At the 1996 census, 25% of Maori
either didn’t know their iwi or chose not to affiliate with it. Id. at 18.
28. Id. at 4.
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relinquish them to a lesser status, both within the Maori
29
community as well as within the nation as a whole. In fact, the
“iwi” has become the “master narrative for constructing the
30
identities and citizenship of Maori in the present.” As a result, a
powerful urban Maori sensibility has emerged that strives to
legitimize the realities of being Maori in the city and secure the
31
right to be recognized.
Through a shared social and political
commitment, urban Maori have created politically active voluntary
associations, pursued litigation, and nurtured economic
32
development. In addition, they have recreated traditional Maori
structures of whanau, hapu (subtribe) and iwi and replaced them
33
with pan-tribal relationships and urban marae (meeting houses).
Unfortunately, these types of pan-tribal movements are not always
well-received and are sometimes viewed as the means by which the
34
“power-culture” further tyrannizes the minority.
These inter- and intra-racial tensions are also located within a
multicultural context. In addition to the significant number of
Pacific Islanders, population patterns have been significantly
35
altered by recent large-scale migrations, mainly from Asia. Asks a
New Zealand Herald editorial, “[I]s this country bicultural or
multicultural? It is a question that ought to be answered by all New
Zealanders. When all answer, there can be no mistaking the
36
Despite the trauma
multicultural character of this country.”
associated with being colonized and the subsequent rights secured
37
under the Treaty of Waitangi, many New Zealanders argue that
Maori “are not the only cultural minority in need of legal
38
Yet, the former Minister of Maori Affairs, Tau
protection.”
Henare, resists being crowded out by “newly arriving people” and
39
believes priority should be given to Maori issues. It seems hard
enough for the nation to figure out what biracialism means (“[c]an
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id. at 4-6.
33. Id.
34. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 156.
35. Dr. Rajen Prasad, Annual Report of the Race Relations Conciliator for the Year
Ending 30 June 1996, in 2 HUM. RTS. L. & PRACT. 211, 215 (1997)[ hereinafter
Annual Report].
36. We’re New Zealanders, N.Z. HERALD, June 24, 1999, at A16.
37. See infra Part II. B.
38. We’re New Zealanders, supra note 36, at A16.
39. Maori Culture ‘Fighting to Survive,’ N.Z. HERALD, June 29, 1999, at A16.
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it really be a fusion of Maori and Pakeha cultures, each a reflection
40
of the other, or is that just a pipe-dream of political correctness?” )
much less multiracialism, despite its appeal. Some suggest that
41
perhaps both are achievable.
2. Maori Culture and Identity
[T]he preconception of Maori culture as a whole way of
life ideologically obscures both the present deterioration
of Maori society and the colonial and recent history which
has instead constituted Maori culture as a whole way of
struggle. The beneficiaries of the cultural “Renaissance”
may be more its opportunist patrons, Maori as well as
42
Pakeha, than the majority of Maori themselves.
— Steven Webster, Visiting Anthropologist
Pakeha columnist Charmaine Pountney writes that most New
Zealanders are comfortable with the idea of a multi-cultural society
43
as long as it means a variety of “costumes, cuisines, or churches.”
Without an exploration of different values and ethics, she argues,
44
society will not be harmonious. However, neither costumes and
cuisines, nor values and ethics capture the systemic nature of the
racial tensions and inequalities that persist New Zealand. Instead,
argues Webster, Maori culture has the capacity to mask this
systemic quality.
45
Maori culture is fighting to survive in New Zealand. Through

40. LAIDLAW, supra note 11, at 26.
41. Id. According to one report, “From a race relations perspective in the
New Zealand context, it is inappropriate to see biculturalism and multiculturalism
as polar opposites. The term biculturalism is appropriately used to describe the
Treaty relations between Maori and the Crown, and from this relationship
emerges a number of rights and responsibilities. Multiculturalism is therefore not
a counter to biculturalism because it refers to quite a different image of a society
and one that rests comfortably with the concept of biculturalism described above.”
Annual Report, supra note 35, at 215.
42. WEBSTER, supra note 22, at 19.
43. Charmaine Pountney, Racial Harmony: We Need Different Rooms in a Common
House, N.Z. HERALD, July 5, 1999, at A13.
44. Id. Charmaine proposes a national code of ethics, or statement of values
that “would say what we want, as well as what we don’t accept. It would state what
we are trying to be, rather than what we are, and it would include no penalties. It
would be in clear, simple language and in every language used in our community.
Discussing and trying to agree on a national code of ethics could provide a useful
focus for redirecting much of the negativity which infects our national life at
present.” Id.
45. Maori Culture ‘Fighting to Survive,’ N.Z. HERALD, June 29, 1999, at A16.
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great effort, however, the Maori language has managed to survive
as one of the primary weapons utilized in this fight. Maori seek to
46
nurture it just as the nation seeks to nurture the kiwi.
Maori is the foundation language of New Zealand, the
ancestral language of the tangata whenua (people of the
land) and one of the taonga (rights, property, anything
highly prized). . . . Maori culture is part of the heritage of
New Zealand, with the language at the heart of the
culture. To Maori, the language is taonga tuku iho (a gift
handed down by their ancestors) and key to all things
47
Maori.
Their language, however, was almost lost. Between 1913 and
1953 the number of Maori school children who could speak Maori
decreased from 90% to 26%. By 1998, only 8% of all Maori adults
48
were fluent in it. Their number is now increasing, however. In
addition, thousands of Maori children are enrolled in Maori
49
language schools, and the Maori Language Commission is looking
50
for ways to encourage the learning of Maori. Since 1992, 24,000
51
Pakeha children have also begun to learn Maori at school, and
certain Maori words are used regularly by non-Maori and in print.
52
The Maori Language Act of 1987, which made Maori an official
language, conveys the right to speak it in all legal proceedings,
regardless of the ability to understand or communicate in English
53
or any other language.
Despite these strides, the language is
retained at the margins by those New Zealanders who feel

46. Frankie Letford, Nurture Maori Language, N.Z. HERALD, July 19, 1999, at
A12. The kiwi is a nocturnal bird, unique to New Zealand. New Zealanders have
come to be called “Kiwis” because of this. Neither is to be confused with the
kiwifruit.
47. Richard Knight, Survival is Becoming a Race Against Time, N.Z. HERALD,
June 1, 1999, at A15.
48. Id.
49. Richard Knight, New Vigour in Teaching Maori to People Gaining Second
Language, N.Z. HERALD, July 26, 1999, at A11. Kohanga reo are preschools with
Maori language as the main teaching language; and kura kaupapa are elementary
and intermediate schools that teach traditional Maori values and conduct all
lessons in Maori. Id. Whare wananga are tertiary educational institutions with an
emphasis on Maori language, but covering all ranges of subjects. Id.
50. Id. The Government is utilizing both visual and oral techniques. Id.
51. Rawiri Taonui, Two Peoples, One Nation and Room for Optimism, N.Z.
HERALD, Feb. 5, 1999, at A13.
52. Maori Language Act, 1987 (N.Z.).
53. Willie Jackson, Racism Behind Fury Over Anthem Sung in Maori, N.Z.
HERALD, Oct. 15, 1999, at A15.
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54

contempt toward it.
Other aspects of Maori culture that are highly visible to non55
Maori—such as the haka (chant), or historical displays at tourist
sites—may be doing more to threaten the integrity of the culture
than to preserve it and often fail to ameliorate the socio-economic
56
conditions of Maori. For example, a recent movement to draw
tourists to the markets, marae, and cultural performances of South
Auckland, may do little to remedy the systemic nature of the
57
renowned concentrated poverty embedded there.
Stephen Webster argues that the popular stereotype of Maori
cultural identity actually subverts and obscures their struggle by
58
protecting sources of power and avoiding real social change. This
stereotype includes such characteristics as:
[k]in [whanau] and community solidarity; respected and
authoritative elders; public ceremonial and ritual
symbolism in hui at marae (gatherings at kin-based
meeting places including meeting-houses decorated with
symbolic carvings, weavings, and paintings); generosity
and sharing of resources; Maori language as mother
tongue; harmony with the natural world; and profound
spirituality centered in notions of tapu (‘taboo’), mana
59
(‘prestige’), and wairua (‘spirit’).
Webster argues further that these characteristics often
function in an essentialist way. They are assumed to be “grounded
primordially in tradition” and to describe “the whole way of life of
contemporary Maori society, regardless of its struggles in a quite
60
different daily political economic reality.” Unfortunately, argues
Webster, the cultural renaissance that has brought these characters
to the attention of the nation has done little to change the
54. Id.
55. The haka is often performed before important sports matches by team
members for inspiration.
56. Richard Knight, Authenticity Haunts Maori, N.Z. HERALD, June 7, 1999, at
A15. A survey of Te Arawa leaders from the popular tourist city Rotarua,
suggested that some guides lied and that the exploitation of Maori culture
degraded it. Id. But local operators say “history, scenery and authenticity all play
an important role” and local elders help maintain the balance between success
and staying true. Id.
57. Nick Perry, Bright Lights of Otara to Beckon Tourist Dollars, N.Z. HERALD, July
21, 1999, at A1. The devastation of South Auckland was featured in the 1994 film,
Once Were Warriors.
58. WEBSTER, supra note 22, at 21.
59. Id. at 29.
60. Id.
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established structures and has left the majority of Maori largely
61
unaffected. “There is ironic truth in the phrase, ‘I’m a born-again
Maori’,” notes Webster, in that any change likely to come about
from this cultural momentum is likely to be “individual,
62
psychological, or spiritual.”
The other side of Maori culture is more real:
[T]he insistent assertion of ignorance of Maori culture . . .
black wool singlets, gumboots, and acrid sweat of forestry,
shearing, and slaughterhouse gangs; two street
maintenance workers leaning on shovels and watching a
third dig around a water main; young unemployed eyes
gazing expressionlessly from under a baggy stocking cap;
battered women nevertheless staunch in standing up for
their men; chain-smoking unto death; defiantly sprawling
graffiti asserting that ‘Maoridom is boredom’; street-kid
‘homies’ sleeping in derelict buildings; the shapeless
threat of a motorcycle gang in the park; Black Power
living in the midst of a ‘traditional’ Maori community; a
Maori haka or war dance done not by a rugby team, but by
the inmates of a gaol; the laconic denial by an inmate
tattooist that Maori motifs might be in need of the expert
advice of Maori elders; every TV screen tuned in to a
Maori motif flown on the spinnaker of the Bank of New
Zealand yacht in the America’s Cup race; a jagged scar
where a piece is torn from the sacrosanct carving in the
Maori meeting-house of a university most Maori can never
63
hope to enter.
Paul Meredith of Waikato University agrees with Webster that
the nation must abandon its romantic notions of “the authentic
64
Drawing
‘Maori’” or “the innocent essential ‘Maori’ subject.”
upon Stuart Hall’s work with “black” as a category, Meredith rejects
fixed, transcendental racial categories. Instead he favors an
understanding of “Maori” as a politically and culturally constructed
category that can account for a complex plurality of “Maori”
65
subjects.
61. Id. at 33.
62. Id. at 39.
63. Id. at 49.
64. Paul Meredith, Seeing the “Maori Subject”: Some Discussion Points,
th
Paper Presented at the 10 Annual General Meeting of The “Maori” Law Society 3
(1998). Meredith is of Ngati Kaputui and Pakeha origins. [transcript of speech
available with author].
65. Meredith, supra note 64, at 3 (citing STUART HALL, DAVID MORLEY & KUAN-
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According to Meredith, prior to the arrival of Pakehas, the
word maori meant “normal” or “usual”. There was no one
dominant Maori identity. Instead, community members were
66
defined by whanau, iwi, and the surrounding terrain. Only when
the tangata whenua (people of the land) contrasted so starkly with
Pakeha did a common ethnicity emerge. Early missionaries pushed
this new Maori identity through conversion and sought an end to
tribal distinctions. This colonization process, along with later
urbanization and immigration, has lead some Maori to adopt a
67
pan-Maori identity. However, argues Meredith, to be Maori is to
be more than one essential thing, it is to have a gender, class,
political orientation, religious preference, sexual orientation,
68
etc. . . .
To essentialize Maoriness is to facilitate the ongoing
69
colonial project of acculturation, pragmatism, and expedience.
Fostering an anti-essentialist understanding of Maori in New
Zealand requires an examination of the two most embracing
structural contexts in which their experience(s) unfold: the Treaty
of Waitangi and the recent neo-liberal economic reform.
B. Te Tiriti o Waitangi—The Treaty of Waitangi
1. Historical Foundations of the Treaty
[The] Maori protest has kept the treaty alive more than
any other single factor. It has challenged the longstanding assumption that the treaty forged ‘one people’
and that New Zealand was a special experiment in
relationships between a European and an indigenous
people. . . . In many respects New Zealand, in spite of the
treaty, has been merely a variation in the pattern of
70
colonial domination of indigenous races.
— Claudia Orange, Historian
According to legend, Polynesians first arrived in this South
th
Pacific group of islands in the 10 century naming it Aotearoa,
“land of the Long White Cloud,” although archaeological evidence
HSING CHEN,

STUART HALL: CRITICAL DIALOGUES IN CULTURAL STUDIES (1996).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 8-9. For this reason, references to the experience(s) of Maori are
made in the optional plural form throughout this article.
70. CLAUDIA ORANGE, THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 5 (1987).
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71

suggests settlements existing as far back as 700 B.C. The early
Maori social system was based on kinship, chiefly leadership, and a
shared language and belief system based on mana and tapu. After
Captain Cook’s three exploratory voyages, British frontiers of trade
and Christianity turned toward Aotearoa. Beginning in 1800, naval
and commercial vessels exploited resources regularly. By the mid1830s semi-permanent trader-settlers established themselves along
72
the coast, increasing to over 2000 permanent settlers by 1839.
Initial Maori-Pakeha contact proved mutually advantageous.
Maori traded their services and provisions for European trade
goods, and Europeans proceeded to extract the natural products of
the land. Once subsistence farmers and food-gatherers, Maori
began cultivating crops for trade and learning to read and write in
Maori. Some became Christian or integrated it into Maori ritenga
(custom). Change was more rapid along the coast of the North
Island, while the inland and South Island remained largely
73
unaffected until the 1830s.
By then an increasing number of
redcoats, settler militia, and kupapa auxiliaries (Maori
collaborators) were confiscating Maori lands and undermining
their iwi organizations. When Maori tried to acquire the skills
needed to conform, they found themselves trapped in a legal
jungle that made it difficult to develop, but easy to sell, their
74
lands.
Consequently, Maori appealed to the British Crown for
75
protection. As historian Claudia Orange argues, “All parties who
expressed an interest in New Zealand . . . shared the conviction
that British intervention was both necessary and desirable.
Opinion differed only on the extent . . . and the role that the Maori
people should play. It was now a question of whose interests were
76
to come first . . . .”
In 1835, at the urging of concerned
missionaries, thirty-four rangatira (chiefs) signed a Declaration of
Sovereignty, asking the British Crown to be a parent and protector
of their independent infant state. Ironically, the Crown viewed this
71. KING, supra note 4, at 9.
72. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 6.
73. Id. at 7.
74. ALAN WARD, AN UNSETTLED HISTORY 4 (1999).
75. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 11-12. They first appealed in 1830 after “The
Elizabeth Affair” when an English captain conspired with the Ngati Toa of Kapiti to
raid the Ngai Tahu of The South Island, and then again in 1831 when rumors
circulated that a French warship intended to annex Aotearoa. Id.
76. Id. at 26.
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document as the means by which to make the Aotearoa a
dependency and later a Protectorate, prompting it to consider
77
negotiating a treaty that would secure the right to pass laws.
Although it was rare for colonizers to negotiate rights with the
indigenous populations, the Maori were more militarily and
economically organized than other populations Britain
78
encountered.
In 1840, the Treaty of Waitangi was drafted by the British and
presented to the Maori in a manner calculated to secure their
agreement. The transfer of power to the Crown was downplayed
and Maori suspicions lulled by the assurance of a degree of
rangatiratanga (sovereignty) and the extension of law, order,
79
protection, and other rights. There were actually two treaties—
one in English and one in Maori (with its subsequent English
translation). Because of this, the exact meaning of the Treaty was
uncertain. As Orange describes it:
Confusion surrounded the treaty from the first. The
treaty in English ceded to Britain the sovereignty of New
Zealand and gave the Crown an exclusive right of preemption of such lands as the Maori people wished to sell.
In return, the Maori were guaranteed full rights of
ownership of their lands, forests, fisheries and other
prized possessions [taonga]. The treaty also promised
them the rights and privileges of British subjects, together
with assurances of Crown protection. Only thirty-nine
chiefs signed this treaty in the English language, however.
Most signed a treaty in the Maori language. The text
failed to convey the meaning of the English version, and
the treaty negotiations did not clarify the difference. Each
party to the treaty was left with expectations about the
80
power they would exercise.
To the British, the Treaty cleared away a legal impediment to
assertion of British sovereignty, answered contemporary
humanitarian interests to ‘protect’ native races, and secured Maori
81
co-operation as a basis for peaceful European settlement. It also

77. Id. at 21; Sir Douglas Graham, Declaration of Sovereignty was Superseded By
Treaty, N.Z. HERALD, Feb. 22, 1999, at A13.
78. KEN S. COATES & P.G. MCHUGH, LIVING RELATIONSHIPS, KOKIRI NGATAHI:
THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 30 (1998).
79. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 32-33.
80. Id. at 1.
81. Id. at 2.
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served to curtail French expansion in the Pacific, and regulate
82
privately owned, opportunistic land settlement companies.
Although there was no single Maori understanding of the
Treaty, Rawiri Taonui, lecturer in history at the University of
Auckland, argues that it was viewed as an “honourable pact
83
between themselves and the new arrivals.”
Despite this
understanding, an outbreak of fighting in the 1850s over land,
authority, and rangatiratanga required Britain to secure sovereignty
on the battlefield and in the colonial parliament, where they had
gained it in name only. Despite these tensions, a major hui
(meeting) of rangatira was held near Auckland in the 1860s to
clarify the Treaty’s clauses and serve as a Maori ‘ratification.’
Again, because the Crown presented the Treaty in its most
benevolent light, Maori leaders came away viewing it as a primarily
84
protective, religious-like covenant that left their mana intact.
By the 1860s, however, Britain was systematically suppressing
the Maori. A new translation of the Treaty clarified the official
meaning: Maori had signed away sovereignty of the country in 1840
and there was neither a cause for separate governmental
institutions, nor a basis for alleging the abridgment of any
85
enumerated rights. The newly formed settler government, which
now had substantial control, “assumed full responsibility over and
subjugated the Maori, perpetrated a series of unjust wars,
confiscated and/or forced Maori to sell vast tracts of land, and
86
passed immoral legislation.” As a result, the Maori were deprived
87
of the most basic rights.
Nonetheless, Maori still believed Treaty promises were going
to be honored, directing hundreds of petitions to the government
88
and protesting to England.
These petitions, along with early
protests over land in the 1880s, forced the government to publicly
82. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13.
83. Id. However, the reality of colonization and suppression belied this
impression. For example, after the Treaty, Maori were detained without trial and
banned from speaking their language in schools.
84. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 4.
85. Id. at 3.
86. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13. Lands were first taken through
confiscations pursuant to the New Zealand Settlements Act, 1863 (N.Z.), then
through the Native Land Court under the Native Land Act, 1865 (N.Z.). Seas and
waterways were also taken through legislation such as the Oyster Fisheries Act,
1867 (N.Z.).
87. Id.
88. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 4.
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dismiss the Treaty. Some representatives even claimed that Captain
Cook’s discovery was the actual basis for the assertion of
89
By 1900, the economic, cultural and political
sovereignty.
90
suppression of the Maori was substantially complete and by 1930
less than 6% of original lands remained in their hands, most of it
91
impossible to farm.
This loss of land led to a loss of
rangatiratanga—“the capacity for self-determination which can only
92
come with control over resources.” The Treaty would not receive
official prominence again until the centenary approached in 1940
and Pakeha were seeking symbols to express their budding
93
nationhood.
One of the first symbols to emerge was the Treaty House, the
site of the original Treaty signing in the Northland. When the
house was gifted to the nation in 1934, it quickly revived the Treaty
as an icon of the nation’s identity. The Treaty was subsequently
promoted, alongside what Taonui describes as the “fiction of racial
harmony in New Zealand,” while “the real history of injustice was
94
laid aside.”
But Maori continued to petition the Government and the
95
And in the 1970s, when a recession
British Crown for relief.
further marginalized and urbanized Maori, the educated Maori
elite began to organize to reject assimilation and minority status
and to secure “first occupants” rights under the Treaty. Protests
and direct action began to dominate Maori-Pakeha relations. Land
occupations were particularly successful, the most renowned of
which was of Bastion Point, one of the few remaining areas held by
96
Maori in Auckland. Pakeha were taken by surprise. They believed
89. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 3-4. William Fox, a veteran colonial politician,
wrote a lengthy exposition claiming the Treaty was an invalid basis for the
assertion of sovereignty. Id. at 3.
90. Taonui, supra note 51.
91. WARD, supra note 74, at 4.
92. Id. at 6.
93. ORANGE, supra note 70, at 3-4; Taonui, supra note 51, at A13.
94. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13.
95. Id.
96. Rawiri Taonui, Bastion Point Evictions: Only Now is the Real Story Told, N.Z.
HERALD, June 29, 1999, at A13. The government had been (mis)using this area
and one other Maori holdout, Okahu Bay, for positioning guns (it was thought the
Russians might invade in the 1850s) and later for such projects as sewage lines—
although Maori homes remained unconnected. Maori were refused building
permits and then labeled backward and blamed for the destitution. Their homes
and a marae were even burned in the 1950s to prepare for the Queen’s visit. When
the government planned to subdivide Bastion Point, the Nagati Whatua people
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that Maori already enjoyed equal rights and that New Zealand was
97
different from other countries such as America or South Africa.
As a result of these protests, the Treaty of Waitangi Act of
98
1975 created the Waitangi Tribunal to hear Maori claims of Treaty
99
breaches. Along with amendments such as the Treaty of Waitangi
100
Amendment Act of 1985, which allows for historical claims going
back to 1840, this legislation provides Maori due process for
101
As might be
seeking reparations and restoring rangatiratanga.
102
expected, however, the Crown
controls all major Treaty
organizations such as the Tribunal and the Office of Treaty
Settlements. The Tribunal, which has the most Maori input, is also
the least powerful and chronically lacks adequate funding. It can
make findings about the validity of claims and recommend
compensation, but only subsequent Crown or court opinions can
103
render these findings binding.
Approximately half of the
Tribunal’s recommendations have been ignored by the
government and some have yielded negative outcomes, which
104
Maori have contested.
105
As of 1999, the New Zealand Crown had paid $600 million
106
in compensation to Maori and there were approximately 790
107
claims still remaining before the Tribunal.
Some argue that all
historical claims can be settled within a couple of decades, but that
the Tribunal will always be needed for the resolution of current

rose up and occupied the land. In the late 1980s, a $3 million settlement was
reached. The Ngati Whatua now have land elsewhere and lucrative development
projects. Id.
97. WARD, supra note 74, at 22.
98. Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975 (N.Z.).
99. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13; WARD, supra note 74, at 7.
100. Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985 (N.Z.).
101. WARD, supra note 74, at 25. Other amendments extended due process in
relation to State-owned Enterprise land and Crown forestry land.
102. “Crown” will hereinafter be used in reference to the New Zealand
government.
103. Rawiri Taonui, Treaty Negotiations: Act with Patience, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 7,
1999, at A17. The Tribunal has some power to compulsorily return state-owned
enterprise lands and crown forests but has only threatened to use this power once.
Id.
104. Paul Spoonley, A Long Way to Go Before All Maori Issues Are Settled, N.Z.
HERALD, Dec. 3, 1999, at A15. Much Maori controversy is between rural iwi and
urban Maori or between iwi and hapu (subtribes).
105. All references to dollar amounts refer to the New Zealand dollar.
106. Taonui, supra note 51, at A13.
107. Spoonley, supra note 104, at A15.
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108

issues. Others, like Richard Pribble, leader of the political party,
ACT, have called for the abolishment of the Tribunal and the final
109
settlement of all claims within the next decade.
2. Current Treaty Claims
I say to Maoridom: ‘Mandate your people and get on to
negotiate. Get out of the courts and into the [negotiating]
room so we can negotiate these things with ministers and
110
make progress.’
— Jenny Shipley, National Party Prime Minister, 1999
Current Treaty claims assume many forms and illustrate the
111
limitations of the claims process.
a. Land Claims
Land claims are the most common. For example, the
Muriwhenua (Far North) Land Claim, one of the first to be lodged,
has yet to be settled. The difficulty lies in uniting five iwi and 30
112
Bitter inter-iwi disputes over
separate claims in one settlement.
who has the mandate to represent them in negotiations, and how
settlement and compensation distribution processes will be
113
handled have caused lengthy delays.
A recently formed joint
114
negotiating team has faltered, and the Director of the Tribunal
has called for an independent, well-resourced, culturally
115
appropriate body to deal with treaty claim settlement disputes.
108.
109.

WARD, supra note 74, at 167.
Spoonley, supra note 104, at A15. See also Courage is Priority for Treaty Pact,
SUNDAY STAR TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at A10.
110. John Armstrong, Shipley Urges Treaty Action, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 1, 1999, at
A5.
111. This is not to suggest that all settlements are disappointing. The Ngai
Tahu have been particularly successful in balancing economic development with
bettering the welfare of the iwi and its members. Even though they accepted a
settlement at a fraction of their loss, they have been able to buy Crown assets and
develop subsidiary investments, particularly tourism. Improvements include a
stronger economic base, increased job opportunities, housing development, and
scholarships and grants for tertiary education. The government controlled Trust
Board has even been replaced with a regionally-elected organization. Richard
Knight, Tribe Eyes Court Over Land Loss, N.Z. HERALD, May 11, 1999, at A5.
112. Jan Corbett and James Gardiner, Tribal Infighting Stalls Claim, N.Z.
HERALD, Aug. 23-24, 1999, at A15.
113. Tony Gee, Move on Our Claim Before Election: Iwi, N.Z. HERALD, Sep. 11,
1999, at A10.
114. Minister Accused of Divide-and-Rule Ploy, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 5, 1999, at A8.
115. Richard Knight, Tribal Infighting Spurs Disputes Service Plan, N.Z. HERALD,
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More recently, the Crown settled a land claim with a Turangi
hapu (subtribe) for the taking of land under compulsory order in
116
The Tribunal found that the
1964 to support a power scheme.
Crown took more land than it said it would and broke its promise
117
In addition to $5 million compensation in cash
to lease it back.
and properties, the Crown also deeded the Turangitukua House, a
118
site of cultural significance, to the hapu.
However, management
and control of some of the reserves remain with the area district
council rather than with Maori, who accuse the Crown of not
119
trusting them to manage their own land.
Land claims settlements have also been troubled by the
perceived importance of the disputed land to the “nation as a
whole”—writ Pakeha. Claims that Maori rangatira (chiefs) were
deceived into signing away part of the capital city, Wellington,
120
could result in nearly $10 billion compensation.
The
121
mythologically significant Whanganui River has also been subject
122
In 1999, after nearly 120 years of advocacy, the
to a claim.
Tribunal recommended the river be vested with the Atihaunui
people and the Whanganui River Maori Trust Board be given
123
management power over uses of the waterway.
Critics are
worried about the precedent, however. As one MP (member of
parliament) puts it, “everything, including air, water and sunlight
together with the ownership of all native plants and animals in New

Feb. 10, 1999, at A12.
116. Treaty Deal Will Return to Haunt Government Say MPs, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 7,
1999, at A12. Some even think that the land should be handed back to
descendants of the original owners. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Maori May be Entitled to Wellington, N.Z. HERALD, April 1, 1999, at A6. This
claim was recently reinforced by historical evidence discovered from a New
Zealand Company land purchase officer.
121. Rawiri Taonui, Sacred River Much More than Just a Waterway, N.Z. HERALD,
July 5, 1999, at A13. In mythology, the Whanganui River valley is the rift left by
Maunga (Mount) Taranaki when he fled to the west after losing a battle with
Maunga Tongariro over the love of Maunga Pihanga. Id. Water flowing from a
wound in Tongariro’s side formed the river. Id. The river is a living entity of the
Atihaunui. Id. It is their ancestor, their kin-relation and the living embodiment of
all that they are. Id.
122. Id. The Atihaunui people lost 1.3 million acres and water flow when the
river was diverted into a power scheme. Id.
123. Eugene Bingham, Tour Operators Display Grasp of ‘Spirituality,’ N.Z.
HERALD, June 28, 1999, at A3.
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124

b. Fishing Rights Claims
Indeed, recent claims are not limited to land. Several
thousand Maori from the Far North planned to file a claim in 1999
when the government threatened to remove the moratorium on
125
permits for commercial harvesting of seaweed.
More
importantly, many claims have been lodged to secure fisheries
rights after British colonization destroyed what was an extensive
126
Maori fishing industry.
The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission was established
in 1992 as part of the Sealord deal, “in which Maori relinquished
commercial fishing rights in return for quota, cash and shares in
127
The Commission is responsible for
the fishing company.”
sharing out Maori fishing assets which it has successfully increased
from an initial $190 million to $600 million. Although it tries to
ensure that all Maori benefit from the assets and has even set up a
128
help-line to assist people in learning which tribe they belong to,
the Commission has faced court action ten times because of its
129
procedure for allocating fishing rights to different Maori groups.
Because only mandated iwi organizations have the right to deal
with the Commission, litigation to identify who actually possesses
124. Audrey Young, Precedent a Worry, Says Act MP, N.Z. HERALD, June 28, 1999,
at A3. For example, the foreshore, seabed and water of the Hauraki Gulf around
Auckland are subject to a complaint asking for a 50% management role in a
proposed marine park. Richard Knight, Maori Demand More Say on Marine Park,
N.Z. HERALD, July 15, 1999, at A18.
125. Richard Knight, Maori Lodge Seaweed Plea, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 2, 1999, at
A18. Seaweed is a traditional food and medicine source for Maori.
126. Alison Horwood, Onus on Maori to Care for Fisheries: O’Regan, N.Z. HERALD,
Oct. 13, 1999, at A13.
127. Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claim) Settlement Act, 1992 (N.Z.); Richard
Knight, Fisheries Anger Brings Threat of More Litigation, N.Z. HERALD, July 24-25,
1999, at A5.
128. Whaimutu Dewes, Time for Fishing Assets to Go to Traditional Maori Tribes,
N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 22, 1999, at A13. The Commission works out of two premises:
the collective nature of the property requires allocation through iwis; and all
Maori must benefit from the settlement. Id. Iwis, in return, must act for benefit of
all their members. Id. Whether assets should be distributed on the basis of
population or as property rights to tribes with a fishing tradition is still contested.
The Tribunal, however, has confirmed Ngai Tahu’s rights to claim the fisheries off
their coast because their rohe (boundary) takes in the majority of the South Island.
MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 156.
129. Richard Knight, Constant Litigation Leaves Fish Body to Flounder in Legal Net,
N.Z. HERALD, April 13, 1999, at A11.
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this mandate continues. The result is confusion between Maori
and non-Maori and problems not only for fishery assets, but for the
130
Matters are further complicated by
claims process as a whole.
urban Maori authorities who have demanded they be taken into
account. Their quest to be designated as an iwi with rights to the
131
distribution of assets has largely failed in the courts. In response,
the Minister of Maori Affairs in mid-1999, Tau Henere, called for
the reconstitution of the Commission to include urban Maori
132
representatives, which traditional iwi opposed.
c. Other Claims
Other Treaty claims include demanding the continuation of
133
the Maori news service on national radio, achieving greater Maori
134
control of the New Zealand Film Commission, and participating
in radio wave auctions—all three of which focus on issues of access
to resources to advance the Maori language and culture. In the
case of radio waves, in 1999, the Tribunal found that the Crown
had failed to consult Maori about the sale of the nation’s airwaves
135
as required under the Treaty.
It called for damages and for
Maori participation in any future auction of radio waves, whether
136
The Tribunal’s recommendations
for data, radio, or television.
sparked heated debate. Neither Maori nor Pakeha knew of the
electromagnetic spectrum in 1840, so was the Tribunal “stretching
its credibility” when it found the Crown guilty of an “‘aggravated
137
breach’ of the Treaty?” Was it overstepping its scope of operation
138
by offering Maori “a free ride” for any asset they could think of?
130. Id.
131. Id. In 1999, urban Maori asked Justice Paterson in the High Court at
Auckland to decide what constituted an iwi. His decision was that urban
authorities had no claim on assets. The Appeals Court rejected their case against
allocating fishing assets through tribes (iwis). Dewes, supra note 128.
132. Knight, supra note 127.
133. Richard Knight, End of Maori Radio News Attacked as Treaty Breach, N.Z.
HERALD, July 9, 1999, at A14. Three daily news bulletins were stopped in early July
1999. Id.
134. Louisa Cleave, Maori Seek Bigger Role in Film Commission, N.Z. HERALD, Feb.
15, 1999, at A4. Maori film-makers have lodged a claim with the Waitangi
Tribunal for greater control over the Commission and its $12 million annual
budget which is the main source of funding for the film industry. Id.
135. Keith Newman & Keith Perry, Maori Victory in Radio Battle, N.Z. HERALD,
July 1, 1999, at A1.
136. Id.
137. Bizarre Treaty Judgment, N.Z. HERALD, July 2, 1999, at A10.
138. Reuben Chapple, Radio Spectrum Belongs to Whole Country, Not a Race, N.Z.
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Or was the Tribunal correct in interpreting the Treaty to require a
sharing of “the then known resources and, by implication, those
139
At the
resources that would subsequently become available?”
heart of this debate was whether the Treaty was meant “to fossilize
the status quo” or to function as a “living instrument to be applied
140
in light of developing circumstances.”
In the end, the
Government rejected the Tribunal’s recommendations and
141
resumed plans to auction the radiowaves.
Alan Ward, a contract historian with the Waitangi Tribunal,
suggests that to overcome the limitations of the Treaty claims
process the Crown should strengthen and racially balance the
Tribunal; develop national reparation guidelines and models for
research; and provide incentives for claimant groups to aggregate
142
their claims and work together.
These suggestions, however,
leave without remedy the lack of attention paid to rangatiratanga or
sovereignty.
3. The Treaty and Rangatiratanga
143

[T]wo pegs have been set in the ground.
— Wira Gardiner, Former Executive Director of the
Ministry of Maori Development
We should be cautious with straightforward sovereignty
claims of either the Crown or Maori . . . . The challenge is
to accept a bit of both . . . [but] can there be a blending
of two cultures if one of them tells the other how to do
144
it?
— Klaus Bosselman, law lecturer, University of Auckland

HERALD, July 19, 1999, at A13.
139. Rawiri Taonui, Airwaves: Maori Entitled to ‘Fair, Equitable’ Share, N.Z.
HERALD, July 12, 1999, at A13. Critics even feared claims would now be made on
everything “from genetic engineering discoveries to oil and gas reserves.” Andrew
Laxon & Keith Perry, Government Cool on Airwaves Decision: Access to Knowledge the
Issue, N.Z. HERALD, July 2, 1999, at A3.
140. Ron Taylor, Does Finding Mean a New Edition of Treaty, N.Z. HERALD, July 34, 1999, at A19; Tanoui, supra note 139, at A13.
141. Angela Gregory, Boilover with Maori Brews Over Radio Spectrum Sale, N.Z.
HERALD, Oct. 21, 1999, at A2. Elders of the largest Maori tribe protested and
planned to appeal to the courts and to the Privy Council in Britain. Id.
142. WARD, supra note 74, at 176-78.
143. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 82.
144. Klaus Bosselmann, Two Cultures Will Become One Only on Equal Terms, N.Z.
HERALD, March. 1, 1999, at A13.
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a. Article II Rights
In Article II of the Maori version of the Treaty of Waitangi, the
Queen gives Maori “tino rangatiratanga” or “full sovereignty” over
their lands, villages and taonga (precious possessions). In the
English version, however, the Queen gives them merely
“undisturbed possession.” Understanding what exactly was given
and what bearing it should have today is critical to national
discourse and identity.
At an undiscerning level, the two versions of the Treaty are
pitted against each other. Many Maori argue that the Treaty
created a partnership to govern the country and that Maori did not
145
cede rangatiratanga in 1840.
Many Pakeha, on the other hand,
argue that reference to the Treaty as a partnership is misleading.
As Sir Douglas Graham, the minister in charge of Treaty
negotiations states:
Once the Treaty had been confirmed, sovereignty as it is
commonly understood, passed from Maori to Britain. If
Maori are still sovereign, . . . then Maori have effectively
terminated the treaty and have no rights under it. They
cannot have it both ways . . . . [The Treaty] certainly did
not create a partnership to govern the country . . . . That
146
function passed to the Crown.
Graham asks what Maori sovereignty would actually look like if
conceded. Would it give Maori the right to pass laws binding on all
New Zealanders or just on Maoris? Would all Maori be subject
somehow to Maori-generated laws but no others? Would Maori
living in Auckland be subject to laws that are different to those
applying to the non-Maori living next door? Obviously Graham
believes sovereignty wouldn’t work: “New Zealand is quite different
to Canada [and the United States], where Indians enjoy limited
self-government on reservations. Here Maori do not lie on
147
reservations—they are fully integrated.” Once the claims process
is complete, Graham concludes, Maori will have the chance “to join
the rest of us” and “work towards a united, peaceful country rather

145. Lynette Waymouth, No Ceding of Sovereignty, N.Z. HERALD, Feb. 26, 1999, at
A13. Waymouth argues that a series of articles and editorials in Te Wananga, a
Maori newspaper from 1874-1878 support this position. Id. Also, the Maori
Council has had plans to lobby APEC countries to recognize Maori sovereignty.
Graham, supra note 77.
146. Graham, supra note 77, at A13.
147. Id.
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148

than promote separatism and division.”
At a more discerning level, Wayne Rumbles of the University of
Waikato School of Law criticizes the claims process for functioning
as a “mask” that excuses the white public “from taking
149
and for
responsibility for its own racism and colonialism”
perpetuating the old relationship of colonizer and colonized. The
Crown determines who will come to the table, what is to be
negotiated, and how. This protects the construction of a unitary
sovereignty and displaces claims for rangatiratanga under Article II.
Rumbles argues that this type of postcolonial practice and
discourse in white settler countries is dangerous. It embraces
diversity without addressing the institutional and constitutional
basis of the colonial societies, which in turn re-inscribes the
colonization process. “Maori are expected to settle for less than 2%
of the value of their claims, to agree to extinguish all historical
grievances . . . and then state that the settlement is fair, full and
final. . . . The Treaty Settlement process is not fair and reasonable,
150
and the Crown is acting to maintain its privileged position. . . .”
This masking process works in the following way. First, it
removes rangatiratanga from the negotiating table altogether. As,
Jim Bolger, the 1995 Prime Minister of New Zealand bluntly stated,
“We can not negotiate the division of sovereignty between various
groups of New Zealanders. That is not possible and won’t
151
happen.”
Next, the masking process removes ethnicity from the
table, removing the “Maoriness from Maori, both textually . . . and
152
For example, the word “Maori” is found only
institutionally.”
once in the Direct Negotiation Booklet where the phrase “claimant
group” is preferred. More importantly the Crown remains in
control of the process, while at the same time backgrounding the
unequal power relationship. The entire process serves an
assimilative purpose and allows for the denial of “Otherness,”
153
claims Rumbles.
The “corporatization of the iwi” as Rumbles describes it, has a
148. Id.
149. Wayne Rumbles, Treaty of Waitangi Settlement Process: New Relationship
or New Mask, Paper Presented at The Compr(om)ising Post/Colonialism
Conference 3 (Feb. 10-13, 1999) available at Te Matahauariki Institute,
http://www.lianz.waikato.ac.nz/.
150. Id. at 13.
151. Id. at 9.
152. Id. at 10.
153. Id. at 9-10.
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similar assimilative effect. Structuring the management of
settlements through corporate organizations “allows Pakeha to see
Maori in terms of their own culture without having to
154
accommodate counter-hegemonic tribal power structures.”
It
also causes difficulty among Maori powerbrokers and those seeking
rangatiratanga:
As has been shown in fisheries settlements among
American Indians, the structure of the settlement itself
creates class differences which fit the indigenous people
more closely into the capitalist structure of the society . . .
[and] neutralizes the ethnic solidarity which forced the
settlement. . . . [T]he new share of wealth will go to
‘tribes’ which are, in effect, capitalist corporations run by
155
a managerial Maori elite.
Building upon this division, the masking process also fosters a
“Good Maori-Bad Maori” dichotomy. Those who settle, claims
Rumbles, are admired as reasonable, sensible, realistic,
reconstituted, postcolonial, post-settlement and capitalist. This
helps Pakeha see Maori in terms of their own culture. On the other
hand, those who don’t settle are seen as unreasonable and
unrealistic. This dichotomy eventually becomes internalized and
seen as natural—hiding the reality of the imbalance in
156
negotiations.
To unmask the Treaty settlement discourse and practice,
Graham recommends several measures: viewing the claims process
as an interim measure to help recreate an economic base for Maori
rather than a full and final solution; exposing the fiction of a
unitary Crown sovereignty; and placing the discussion of Maori
rangatiratanga squarely on the negotiating table “. . . in a fair and
equitable manner and not circumscribed by an unwillingness to
deconstruct [the nation’s] colonial infrastructure and power
157
relationships, which are based on a fiction of unitary sovereignty.”
b. Indigenous Rights
This movement away from unitary notions of sovereignty is
also reflected in international discourse supporting indigenous
rights. In the last fifty years, international pressures have mounted
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 11.
WEBSTER, supra note 22, at 38.
Rumbles, supra note 149, at 11-13.
Id. at 14.
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to resolve the grievances of indigenous peoples dispossessed of
158
their land and culture by paternalistic settler populations.
Almost all demand sovereignty. As stated in the U.N. Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 1994, Article 3,
“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
159
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”
Klaus Bosselmann, law lecturer at the University of Auckland,
argues that Maori rangatiratanga has a sound legal basis under this
emerging post-colonial international law. State sovereignty is no
longer absolute but must be considered along with selfdetermination and human rights. “Accordingly, a concept of ‘joint
government’ based on the Treaty as a ‘partnership’ and
rangatiratanga as the exercise of self-government is ‘a distinct legal
160
option.’”
Bosselmann describes a relationship that allows for
both territorial sovereignty of the Crown and joint government of
Pakeha and Maori.
He argues that a second chamber in
parliament and a Maori legal system would be legitimate and would
not threaten the nation’s sovereignty. An equitably negotiated
written constitution, however, would offer the opportunity to settle
161
the debate.
Legal scholars Ken S. Coates and P.G. McHugh also endorse
this relational approach to indigenous rights for two main reasons.
First, they fear that a claims-based relationship between
government and tribe produce only interim results rather than an
158. COATES & MCHUGH, supra note 78, at 20. Progress has been made by the
Small Peoples of the North in Yakutia (central Siberia in Russia), the First Nations
of the Yukon, and the Inuvialiut of the Mackenzie River basin. Id. at 21. The
Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d.
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), provided a vital international forum for
indigenous rights.
1993 was declared International Year of the Worlds’
Indigenous People; many support groups subsequently emerged (World Council
of Indigenous People; Survival International, Centre for World Indigenous
Studies); in 1982 the Working Group on Indigenous Populations was established
and released the Draft Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 34 I.L.M. 541,
548 (1995), affirming and extending the rights of indigenous peoples. Selfdetermination is central. It requires protection from genocide; guarantees
cultural and intellectual property rights; and requires existing treaties to be
honored. It is heatedly debated. If ratified by the U.S., New Zealand or Canada,
it would lead to internal legal challenges, increased non-indigenous anxiety, and
political conflict. COATES & MCHUGH, supra note 78, at 21-39.
159. 34 I.L.M. 541, 548 (1995). This right is also referred to in various human
rights conventions and other international agreements.
160. Id.
161. Bosselmann, supra note 144.
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ongoing framework for that very relationship. The resolution of
162
Second, they
one claim simply provides the basis for another.
fear that because indigenous rights are western constructs that fail
to reflect the cultures and belief systems of indigenous people (e.g.,
individual land ownership vs. communal connections with physical
surroundings), they must be superseded by a post-structuralist
163
approach in which identity arises and relations are managed.
A post-structuralist approach, argues McHugh, avoids the
appropriation of the dominant culture that results from pitting the
164
rights of the state against those of the tribe.
“It emphasizes a
process and voice as well as continuity and negotiability of identity
and relations rather than illusory and rigid notions of closure and
165
exit.”
As a result, a post-structuralist approach leads to a
cooperative cultural coexistence void of the politics of
166
Interestingly, McHugh sees the United States as an
domination.
emergent model of this approach, displaying growing emphasis at a
federal level upon native consent and cooperation—a “bottom-up”
167
rather than “top-down” approach.
McHugh argues that any
168
agreement—even to talk—is an exercise of sovereignty.
From a distance (McHugh is now teaching at Cambridge) it
looks like New Zealand is moving toward a “relational” approach
through the Treaty claims process. McHugh states that “what

162. P.G. McHugh, Aboriginal Identity and Relations in North America and
Australia, in LIVING RELATIONSHIPS: KOKIRI NGATHI: THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN THE
NEW MILLENIUM, 107, 119 (1998). For example, the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C.A. §1606(2000), granted indigenous peoples of
Alaska title to over 40 million acres of land and $1 billion (U.S. dollars) in return
for the extinguishment of aboriginal title in the state. It was hailed at first, but is
now severely criticized by natives. There was a virtual absence of implementation
mechanisms and a failure to address fundamental questions of state-native
relations. New claims are now resurfacing. Id. at 117.
163. Id. at 111; Ken S. Coates, Introduction New Zealand and Maori-Pakeha
Relations in a Global Context, in LIVING RELATIONSHIPS: KOKIRI NGATHI: THE TREATY
OF WAITANGI IN THE NEW MILLENIUM, 19, 31 (1998).
164. McHugh, supra note 162, at 111.
165. Id. at 170.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 171. For example, In 1994 President Clinton set out principals for
federal dealings with Native Americans. William J. Clinton, Government-toGovernment Relations with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22, 951
(April 29, 1994). They focus on more effective day-to-day working relationships
and respect for rights of self-government due the sovereign tribal governments. Id.
168. McHugh, supra, note 162, at 171 (quoting P.S. Deloria & R. Laurence,
Negotiating Tribal-State “Full-Faith and Credit” Agreements: The Topology of Negotiation
and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 390-91 (1994).
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perhaps is missing, however, is an acceptance that these initiatives,
grounded in Maori participation and consent, are an expression of
169
rangatiratanga.”
Rather, there is a misperception that
rangatiratanga leads to competitive and adversarial relationship with
170
This misperception, argues McHugh, is
the Anglo-settler state.
fostered by the dominance of the claims process, the publicity
given to separatist extremists, and to some extent, by the nature of
171
Maori political discourse itself.
While the claims process must
continue, McHugh calls for a “parallel/supplementary political
environment beyond it” that substitutes the rhetoric of finality and
closure with an explicit more unified, coherent position on
rangatiratanga, issued—perhaps in statement form—after
172
collaboration with Maori.
Such a position could stress the
173
participative character rather than the separatist one. The Crown
could formally recognize the “internal” sovereignty of Maori tribes
174
subject to plenary power of Parliament.
Inter-iwi matters could
be left for Maori resolution, giving the iwis political and
175
This might, however, result in the
constitutional status.
entrenchment of an iwi-based form of Maori representation in the
political process, which would have to be expanded to include
176
urban Maori.
In a response to McHugh, Roger Maaka prefers to avoid
describing the relationship between Government and Maori in
177
terms of competing theories. It is better to see the present reality
of Treaty settlements as “an opportunity to re-conceptualize the
relationship . . . to explore ways and means of creating a new
genuinely post-colonial relationship . . . based on the acceptance
that Maori are a sovereign people because they were the original
occupants, never having relinquished their independence by
178
explicit agreement.”
This understanding of a relationship built
on “interlocking sovereignties” rather than competing ones,
concludes Maaka, “would require a major mind-shift by a number
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 172.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Roger Maaka, A Relationship, not a Problem, in LIVING RELATIONSIPS: KOKIRI
NGATHI: THE TREATY OF WAITANGI IN THE NEW MILLENIUM, 201, 204 (1998).
178. Id.
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179

of both Maori and Pakeha . . . .”

4. The Treaty and the Political Process
My heartfelt thanks to the last term of Parliament for
introducing MMP. This has given a forgotten people of
this nation—made forgettable by the whirlwind of endless
reform—a voice in this House, a voice that will never
180
again be silenced.
— Alamein Kopu, Alliance List MP
As both Bosselman and McHugh suggest, Maori participation
in the political process is a means of achieving both rangatiratanga
and the necessary mind-shift Maaka describes. Prior to 1993, the
electoral system was “first-past-the-post” (FPP), whereby candidates
181
with the most votes in an election were elected to parliament.
According to research economist Brian Easton, this “winner-takesall” (WTA) process resulted in “a virtual dictatorship” once the
182
majority party chose the prime minister.
Only the outcome of
the next election or the very unlikely possibility of the prime
183
minister being overthrown could shift the balance of power.
Under this system, argues Easton, New Zealand was governed by a
ruling elite that was almost exclusively Pakeha, male, middle-aged
184
or older, and British-oriented.
Similar to the United States, two
parties existed that reflected the two ends of the same spectrum,
185
and vigorously contested its center. As such, the political process
failed to reflect the society, which was younger, of color, poorer
186
and over half female.
Seeds of change were planted in the 1970s when the pastoral,
export-driven economy diversified, the country became more U.S.oriented, and women and Maori were selectively introduced into
187
Despite dissatisfaction with the two traditional
governance.
parties, says Easton, “the institutional arrangements were more
179. Id.
180. Anthony Hubbard, Kopu’s 15 Minutes Over, SUNDAY STAR-TIMES, Nov. 28,
1999, at A7.
181. BRIAN EASTON, THE WHIMPERING OF THE STATE: POLICY AFTER MMP 13
(AUCKLAND U. PRESS 1999).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 28.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 29.
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difficult to change, because they were at the foundation of the
188
elite’s power.”
The electoral reform of 1993 introduced a mixed-memberproportional (MMP) electoral regime, virtually eliminating the
189
“winner-takes-all” process.
It is now extremely unlikely, notes
Easton, that any single party will have an absolute majority and
therefore unilaterally appoint a prime minister and cabinet with
190
which to impose polices on parliament. Instead, a multi-party or
191
non-majority-party government will emerge.
In theory, with
increased parliamentary supervision, policy will be of higher quality
and evolve more slowly. Policy will also incorporate real elements
of party differences, involve more public consultation, and better
reflect the electorate’s desires. Groups which have tended to be
excluded from the policy process will have greater influence and
192
public sector spending will increase.
Prior to the reform, Maori were assured four seats in
193
parliament as set out in the Maori Representation Act of 1867,
194
one of the few constitutional guarantees extended to Maori.
With the introduction of MMP, there was concern Maori MPs could
lose their existing seats unless steps were taken. Ultimately, Maori
seats were retained, to be based on the number of Maori who
195
register on a separate Maori roll in preference to the general roll.
As such, under MMP, each voter has two votes: an electoral
district (or constituency) vote and a party-list vote. Maori seats
apply only to electoral district votes. Those on the Maori roll vote
for a representative of a Maori electoral district (a Maori seat),
while voters on general roll vote for a representative of general
electoral district (general seat). For the party-list vote, the rolls are
188. Id.
189. Electoral Act, 1993 (N.Z.).
190. EASTON, supra note 181, at 15.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 123.
193. Maori Representation Act, 1867 (N.Z.).
194. Although not explicitly found in the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori
representation has been recognized as entirely consistent with it. NGATATA LOVE,
The Treaty of Waitangi, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MMP 42, 43 (Alan
Simpson ed., 1998).
195. EASTON, supra note 181, at 36. The “Maori Option” allows Maori to
choose between enrolling on the general roll or the Maori roll. The “Maori
Option case” was decided in 1994 by the Waitangi Tribunal, which accepted Treaty
relevance in a statute that makes no explicit reference to the Treaty. DENESE L.
HENARE, Commentary, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF MMP 49, 56 (Alan
Simpson ed., 1998).
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effectively combined, all list votes are totaled and party-list seats
allocated to parties that competed for the list vote. Lists are made
up by parties, which place their candidate for prime minister at the
196
top.
The impact of MMP on Maori is still being determined. In the
1993 election, four of the ninety-nine constituency seats went to
197
Maori, in 1996, five of sixty-five and in 1999, six of sixty-seven.
Together, the Maori seats constitute the Maori Affairs Select
Committee, which has been likened to the U.S. Congress’ Black
198
Caucus.
According to Ngatata Love, MMP has proved to be a
shot in the arm for Maori who are now participating in much
greater numbers in mainstream politics. The frustrating feeling
that enrolling was a pointless exercise (despite a statutory
199
MMP has also increased the
obligation) has diminished.
incentives for mainstream parties to put Maori high up on their
party-lists. Real oppositional political parties are now seen by more
Maori as means by which to affect sought after changes under the
200
Treaty and to challenge the recent neo-liberal economic reform.
The more seats are contested, argues Love, the more discussion
201
about Maori rights will occur.
Despite these gains, Easton and others are more cautious.
Popular expectations of MMP may have been inflated, providing
202
only an illusion of political choice.
In fact, the moderating
effects of coalitions may mean that major policy changes are
203
204
unlikely.
Maori enrollment is still low, young voters lack
205
206
and confidence in Maori MPs is patchy.
Illdirection,
196. Henare, supra note 195, at 50-51.
197. EASTON, supra note 181, at 36.
198. LOVE, supra note 194, at 47.
199. Id. at 46.
200. See infra Part I.C. The Mana Motuake party broke away from Labour
citing the party’s inability to grapple with the issues raised by Maori within its
ranks (self-determination). It remains electorally insignificant, however. JANE
KELSEY, THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT: A WORLD MODEL FOR STRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT? 305 (AUCKLAND U. PRESS 1997). Other Maori parties include: Mana
Maori, Mana Wahine, and Maori Pacific.
201. LOVE, supra note 194, at 47.
202. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 316.
203. Id. at 316-17.
204. Enrollment Apathy ‘Reflects Maori Disillusion,’ N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 9, 1999 at
A10. A month before the 1999 election, 135,313 people had enrolled in the 6
Maori seats, 6,616 lower than the previous election. Id.
205. Theresa Garner, Young Voters ‘Ripe for the Picking,’ N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 24,
1999, at A10. Researchers from the New Zealand Study of Values found young
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considered party lists produce incompetent MPs and result in party207
A dramatic rejection of Maori parties
hopping and instability.
and a return to the Labour party in the 1999 election may have
been due to a lack of resources and voters, as well as a lack of faith
208
in stand-alone parties.
During the same election, the Labour party aggressively
209
courted the Maori vote. It promised to strengthen the Ministry of
Maori Development, close the gap between Maori and other New
Zealanders in jobs, housing, and education, and create an
international profile for Maori culture through a Maori tourism
210
The focus of Maori within the party was to “improve the
body.
211
Maori economy and close the gap.”
As a result, in the November
election, all five Maori MPs from the NZ First party were replaced
by six Labour MPs including the urban Maori champion, John
212
213
Tamihere —with his “for Maori, by Maori” slogan.
Taonui has urged Maori, however, to reconsider their loyalty
214
The nonto the Labour party because it has “delivered little.”
adults floating around, with no clear-cut ideological positions. “They are lost
within an individualist, isolationist kind of culture, and are at the whim of
whatever forces come to bear on them,” says study director Alan Webster. Id.
206. Richard Knight, Politicians’ Antics Seen as Turnoff for Maori Voters, N.Z.
HERALD, July 13, 1999, at A5. The “Tight Five” MPs in Parliament in 1996—all in
the NZ First party—became known as the “loosies” and lost power. Audrey Young,
MMP a Winning Formula for Maori, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 18, 1999, at A18.
207. Hubbard, supra note 180.
208. Rawiri Taonui, Maori Voters Should Revise Allegiances, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 2,
1999, at A15.
209. Labour Pitches For Maori Vote, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 18, 1999, at A5.
210. Id. Specifically the Labour Party promised to: help young Maori gain
qualifications through a “modern apprenticeship programme”; develop
papakainga—marae-based housing; support self-build schemes; hire more teachers
in Maori language and all core curricula; and stage a hui (meeting) for Maori
educators and community leaders to develop long-term plan. It also promised to
hold the Fisheries Commission accountable to both Crown and Maori and develop
a “fair allocation model.” Id. Other parties made promises to Maori as well:
National: forward-looking; a hand-up vs. hand-outs; NZFirst: loyalty; Maori Pacific:
leverage; no deadline on Treaty settlement; Alliance: policies with vision; Mana
Maori Movement: an independent voice; ACT: to close the gap; Greens: more
funding for the Tribunal; United: budget cap of $200 million/year on treaty
settlements; Christian Heritage: increased Tribunal funding. Young, supra note
206, at A18.
211. Richard Knight, Maori Expect Labour to Deliver, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 29, 1999,
at A7.
212. Donna Chisholm, Maori Voters Flock Back to Labour, SUN. STAR TIMES, Nov.
28, 1999, at A3.
213. Knight, supra note 211.
214. Tanoui, supra note 208, at A15.
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Maori majority will always dictate Maori policy, argues Taonui.
Maori could consider instead creating a pan-party Maori caucus or
strategically using the electorate and party votes to produce pro216
Maori, not pro-Party results.
Alternatively, two parallel
parliamentary houses with provisions to prevent either dictating to
the other could be formed. Although non-Maori would reject this
type of reform, Taonui argues it would be legitimate under the
217
Treaty.
MMP delivers “more Maori into Parliament,” Taonui admits,
218
but, it has not delivered the promised “Maori miracle in politics.”
Or as Easton observes, “It would be easy to argue that MMP restores
(or strengthens) democracy in New Zealand. . . . But this is not
enough. To have an effective democracy . . . requires . . . a re219
establishment of some notion of equity in public policy . . . .”
5. The Treaty and “Civil Rights”
The equity that Easton calls for is often associated with “civil
rights”—at least in the United States. This is not really the case
with the Maori struggle. Most often, Treaty and international
“human rights” discourses dominate. This may be due to the
nature of New Zealand’s foundational documents. New Zealand is
one of only three democratic countries in the world without a
220
written constitution.
Rather, a collection of statutory law, judgemade law, international law, and the Treaty of Waitangi constitute
221
the nation and dictate rights talk.
There is no judicial review of
222
and the final court of appeal remains the Privy
legislation
Council in Britain—although New Zealand might eventually
establish its own court of final appeal. This would inevitably affect
Maori who have always looked to the Queen as their Treaty
223
partner.
A break from Britain, the establishment of an
independent republic, and the drafting of a constitution would also
have serious implications. Aspects of Maori lore such as marae
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
A12.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
EASTON, supra note 181, at 123.
Steven Price, Law is on Shaky Foundations, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 3, 1999, at
Id.
Id.
Privy Council ‘Too Far Away,’ N.Z. HERALD, April 9, 1999, at A8.
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justice and collective ownership of land are already recognized by
224
the legal system, but the New Zealand Law Commission believes
that the nation’s law would be stronger if more value were placed
on Maori tikanga (customs). The law could then be better tailored
225
to ensure the rights of the Maori.
The main existing anti-discrimination statues include the Bill
226
227
of Rights Act of 1990 and the Human Rights Act of 1993. The
former statute secures civil and political rights such as freedom of
228
thought, expression, and association;
freedom from cruel
229
treatment and unreasonable search and seizure; and freedom
from discrimination on the ground of “colour, race, ethnic or
230
national origins, sex, marital status, or religious or ethical belief.”
The latter statute attempts to enforce international covenants and
231
conventions, although it does not resemble them substantively.
Rather than prohibiting discrimination generally, it merely
232
prohibits specific acts in areas such as employment,
public
233
234
accommodations, and housing —and with many exceptions as
235
well.
The complexities of defending Maori rights within this context
and along side the Treaty settlement process can be best illustrated
by examining two specific issues: affirmative action in higher
education and the rights of wahine Maori (women).
224. Maori Customs ‘Need Equal Status,’ N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 13, 1999, at A8.
225. Angela Gregory, Mixing Cultures to Settle Disputes, N.Z. HERALD, March 30,
2001, at A5.
226. Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (N.Z.).
227. Human Rights Act, 1993 (N.Z.). This Act replaced the Race Relations
Act, 1971 (N.Z.) and the Human Rights Commission Act, 1977 (N.Z.). See generally,
Jerome Elkind, Anti-Discrimination Law in New Zealand, 1 HUM. RTS. L. & PRACT.
230 (1996)(outlining the prospects and problems of the Human Rights Act of
1993 and related legislation).
228. Bill of Rights Act, §§ 13, 14, 17, (1990) (N.Z.).
229. Id. §§ 9, 21.
230. Id. §19.
231. Elkind, supra note 227, at 231. These include: The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UN Treaty Service 171, 6 ILM 368
(1967); (entered into force for New Zealand March 28, 1979); The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UN Treaty Service 3, 6
ILM 360 (1967); (entered into force for New Zealand March 28, 1979); and The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/10Add. 6, ¶34 et seq.
232. Human Rights Act, § 22, (1993) (N.Z.).
233. Id. §42.
234. Id. §53.
235. Id. § 44(4). For example, an exception against discrimination in public
accommodations is provided for “clubs.” Id.
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a. Affirmative Action in Higher Education
If it broadens participation in a profession, a little social
236
engineering can do no harm.
— New Zealand Herald
The fluid nature of New Zealand’s foundational documents
might work to the advantage of Maori in the case of affirmative
action, which, unlike in the United States, goes largely
unchallenged in court. This is explicitly due to the Bill of Rights
Act which excludes from discrimination “measures taken in good
faith for the purpose of assisting or advancing persons or groups of
237
persons disadvantaged because of . . . race . . .”; as well as to the
238
Human Rights Act which permits “measures to ensure equality.”
Both of these Acts are derived from international human rights
239
law and legitimize remedial efforts to equalize opportunities for
those persons against whom discrimination is unlawful. Under
them, three elements are required in undertaking an affirmative
action plan: that the plan is done in good faith; that the plan assists
or advances persons of a particular race; and that persons need
(and want) assistance or advancement to achieve an equal place
240
with other members of society.
Because of their explicit endorsement, affirmative action in
241
higher education exists in several forms in New Zealand, from
242
to targeted
quotas found in the law and medical schools
236. A Little Social Medicine, N.Z. HERALD, March 11, 1999, at A14.
237. Bill of Rights Act, §19(2), 1990 (N.Z.).
238. Human Rights Act, §73, 1993 (N.Z.).
239. See The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/10Add. 6, ¶34 et seq.
240. Frances Joychild, Affirmative Action—“Measures to Ensure Equality,” 1 HUM.
RTS. L. & PRACT. 218, 223 (1996)(citing Amaltal Fishing Co. v. Nelson Polytechnic,
Unreported, 29/1/96, Complaints Review Tribunal, Wellington (Decision 1/96,
CRT 3/94)(finding that Nelson Polytechnic failed to show that its quota systems
for fishing cadet courses were specifically needed by Maori and Pacific Islanders
and could not rely on Government policy or mere statistical inequalities for such a
showing)).
241. Shane Cave, Affirmative Action in Access to Education and Employment in New
Zealand, 3 HUM. RTS. L. & PRACT. 15, 17 (1997). Cave points out that affirmative
action also received governmental support under the welfare system prior to the
neo-liberal economic reform in the mid-80s. Id.
242. For example, out of 270 places for 1999 admission, the University of
Auckland Law School held open 32 places for Maori and 13 places for Pacific
Islanders all of whom needed a minimum average of C+ and were to be
interviewed by Maori and Pacific Islander panels respectively. Statistics originally
available at http://mark.law.auckland.ac.nz/1998/prospectus.html, but as of
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education programs most often found in polytechnics.
For example, Auckland’s medical school, concerned for years
with a lack of students of color, established an affirmative action
244
plan in 1998 to attract and retain them. Maori and Pacific Island
students are accepted under a special admissions process, with
245
slightly lower school grades allowed.
Personal qualities such as
246
For Maori and Pacific
maturity and empathy now count as well.
Island health care students that need extra preparation, the
medical school also launched a bridging course called Vision
247
2020.
Once formal studies begin, however, students face the
248
same courses, examinations and standards.
In 1999, a record number of Maori and Pacific Island students
were accepted to the medical school—26 of 104 students at the
University of Auckland. This was double that of 1997, despite a
249
new fee structure raising costs.
Professor Colin Mantell, the head of Maori and Pacific Island
Health at the University of Auckland argues in favor of the
program:
Tertiary institutes need to change their vision to one
where Maori and Pacific Islander students will succeed,
and ensure that opportunities and support are firmly
established. There may be an initial educational deficit
and the challenge is to strike that out as promptly as
250
possible.
Mantell also has asked society to “make the same shift in
August 14, 2001 this website was not available.
243. Cave, supra note 241, at 15. Ethnically targeted education programs are
typically provided by the Government’s Education Training Support Agency
(ETSA).
244. Andrew Young, Ethnic Mix Just What the Doctor Ordered, N.Z. HERALD,
March 10, 1999, at A7.
245. Id. The School used to accept only the top 150 applicants—i.e., those
averaging about 82% over five bursary subjects. Special admissions students are
still bright A bursary students. (Students sit for bursary exams in five or six
th
th
subjects during 7 form—the equivalent of 12 grade. Their top five marks are
totaled up with 500 being the top possible score.)
246. A Little Social Medicine, N.Z. HERALD, March 11, 1999, at A14.
247. Young, supra note 244 at A7. Forty students were enrolled in 1999 and
would decide which health field to train in at the end of the year from nursing to
physiotherapy to medicine.
248. Colin Mantell, Maori, Pacific Health Professionals Needed, N.Z. HERALD,
March 10, 1999, at A15. The bridging program also offers a certificate in health
science. Id.
249. Young, supra note 244 at A7.
250. MANTELL, supra note 248.
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attitude to provide opportunities for Maori and Pacific Islanders”
251
so that they can be part of the health care team. He argues that
252
no apologies need to be made for relaxing barriers.
The
program is welcome because it will improve services to and address
the particular health problems within Maori and Pacific Island
communities.
It will also increase representation of those
minorities within the profession. Moreover, the program does not
drop standards when it opens up the admissions process.
However, some New Zealanders are critical of the special
admissions program, especially as market forces are applied to
tertiary institutions. Significant numbers of the special admission
students are from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Rates of
non-completion by Maori and Pacific Island students at the early
stages are as high as 50%.
Bridging programs are often
underfunded and not compulsory. The students often lack the
requisite academic skills, do not make up this deficit in the time
demanded by university methods of assessment, and suffer undue
financial pressure. Maori complain that because Pakeha control
the universities they “do not yet adequately address the problems
253
these students face.”
They are given heavy loads, expected to
pass and not advised well enough. With rising university fees,
Maori and Pacific Island students can least afford to fail. Yet,
254
special admissions programs have yielded results.
Undoubtedly,
the debate will continue.
b. Rights of Maori Women
What affinity can we share with white women if they refuse
to acknowledge and take responsibility for their
255
colonialism?
— L. Whiu
The Government is under several obligations toward wahine
Maori. While it has been relatively meticulous in complying with its
reporting obligations under the U.N. Convention on the
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Rawiri Taonui, Time to Set Standards for Tertiary Education, N.Z. HERALD,
May 4, 1999, at A13. There are now eight institutions in the north in which Maori
can attain bachelor degrees in Maori studies whereas ten years ago there were only
two. In five years there will probably be four more. Id.
254. Id.
255. L. Whiu, A Maori Woman’s Experience of Feminist Legal Education in Aotearoa,
2 WAIKATO L. REV. 161, 164 (1994).
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Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
256
(CEDAW), the Crown must still address the need for greater pay
equity, adequate childcare facilities, adequate valuation on unpaid
257
work, and an end to domestic violence.
In the area of domestic
violence, Maori women in particular complain that not enough is
being done—especially among their own people. Merepeka
Raukawa-Tait, head of the women’s refuge movement, claims that
senior Maori leaders are spending too much time on tribal
economic issues and enhancing their business portfolios while
thousands of Maori women and children seek protection from
258
violent partners.
The Crown also has specific obligations toward Maori women
under the U.N. Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous
259
260
Peoples and under the Treaty of Waitangi.
Although wahine
have traditionally been active participants in the formal leadership
261
structure of Maori society, the colonization process reshaped the
foundational myths and restructured the extended family, leaving
women dependent and marginalized both nationally and within
262
Maoridom.
As Aroha Mead notes,
[the] sexism which has occurred in Maori society
originates more from colonisation than heritage, and it is
256. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Jan. 22, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 33, 33.
257. Mai Chen, Better Enforcing the Women’s Rights Convention, in HUMAN
RIGHTS—HOW ARE THEY BEST PROTECTED 13, 17 (Paul Hunt ed. 1998). Even
though the Equal Pay Act, 1972 (N.Z.) was passed nearly 30 years ago, the gender
pay gap persists. The average weekly income for full-time female wage-salary jobs
was 76% of that of men. Statistics show that in their early 20s, women’s median
wages are already only 87% of men’s and they keep getting worse. Sandra Coney,
Real Action Needed on Gender Gap, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 21, 1999, at C4.
258. Andrew Stone, Women’s Refuge Head Slams Maori Leaders, N.Z. HERALD, July
5, 1999, at A5. Maori tradition, mana, colonization and unemployment are also no
excuse for domestic violence, argues another Maori woman, Kelly Bennett. “The
traditional way is all rubbish. We were born into the European way. We didn’t
even know the old Maori ways. I’m ashamed and disgusted with my people.”
Carroll Du Chateau, Welfare Worker Ashamed of Aggressive Maori Men, N.Z. HERALD,
Aug. 26, 1999, at A3.
259. Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Aug. 26, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 541, 548.
260. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 72.
261. Id. at 72. In keeping with the Maori worldview that acknowledged
balance and interrelationship, both men and women were essential parts in the
collective whole, including the sharing of power. See generally, R. KAHUKIWA & P.
WAHINE TOA GRACE, WOMEN OF MAORI MYTH (1984).
262. Linda Smith, MaoriWomen: Discourse, Projects and Mana Wahine, in WOMEN
AND EDUCATION IN AOTEAROA 34 (S. Middleton & A. Jones eds., 1992).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss1/10

38

09_FINAL.SPENCER 08.31.01.DOC

2001]

9/7/2001 11:55 AM

Spencer: A White American Female Civil Rights Attorney in New Zealand: Wha
MAORI CIVIL RIGHTS

293

a problem as common in international indigenous
societies as is alienation of lands and resources. Maori
leadership has got to work this through and deprogramme all that does not rightfully belong within our
Iwi histories. Maori women, as we all know, are the
backbone of Maori society. . . . It is unfair, soul destroying
and a tragic waste of much needed skill, energy and
commitment, to continue to deny Maori women their
263
rightful place in Iwi/Maori decision-making.
The resulting inequality manifests itself today in exclusion of
Maori women from meaningful roles in the Treaty settlement
process. The Maori Women’s Welfare League, for example,
recently lodged a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal against the
Crown for failing to protect the rights of Maori women in the
264
Dame Georgina Kirby of Ngati Kahungunu and
Fisheries case.
former National President of the Maori Women’s Welfare League
sums up the claim in this way:
We say they are giving away the mana of Maori women.
We talk about the partnership role of the Treaty and yet
the government denies us a part in that partnership.
When the Crown sets up agencies and mechanisms they
don’t consult with Maori women and they never have.
They do not consider Maori women for decision-making
positions. It happened when the Fisheries Commission
265
was established.
The invisibility of Maori women is particularly evident in the
court proceedings themselves, argues Linda Tuhiwai Smith of the
International Research Institute for Maori and Indigenous
Education. A case like this, says Smith, “is generally about
philosophical issues where there’s a lot at stake politically, manawise, resource-wise; all those things added up . . . silence women’s
266
voices in the formal sense . . . .[I]t’s the whole process.”

263. Aroha Mead, Maori Leadership, Address to the Hui Whakapumau: Maori
Development Conference (Aug. 1994).
264. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
265. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 73.
266. Kei Whea Nga Wahine: A Conversation with Linda Tuhiwai Smith & Kuni
Jenkins, in 3 FISHERIES & COMMODIFYING IWI: ECONOMICS, POLITICS & COLONISATION
13 (1998).
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6. Treaty Fallout
267

We must not lose our nerve now.
— Sir Douglas Graham, Treaty Negotiations Minister
Before leaving the Treaty context, it is helpful to step back and
see how it is viewed in its contemporary application. In October
1999, the New Zealand Study of Values found a significant rise in
hostility toward the Treaty. Those who wanted it “abolished”
increased from a quarter to a third, and those who supported it fell
268
from a third to a quarter.
While there is no one set reaction,
several prototypes emerge.
As expected, there are those Pakeha who are unabashed in
their desire to put an end to the Treaty process. David Round,
Professor of Law at University of Canterbury is most representative:
A blight lies on our country. It destroys conversations and
friendships, sours all political discourse . . . encourages
divisiveness, bitterness and hatred. One side labels the
other reactionaries and racists; the other replies with the
labels of weaklings, dupes and fools. It is the Treaty .
269
. . .”
Other Pakeha take a more assimilative approach, such as social
critic Walter Christie:
Race separatism was not the aim of the Treaty of Waitangi.
It is far from desirable now. From the outset the native
New Zealanders adapted well to the modern world. They
continued doing so for some time until diverted. . . .
Common sense should prevail. We are one people, one
society, one family where differences should enrich not
270
divide.”
While still others, like Paul Spoonley, adopt a more
benevolent, paternalistic tone:
Restitution needs to continue because legitimate
claims . . . should be recognized. But it may be time to
invest energy and resources into other areas. Grievance
could be replaced by development, and a number of
Maori organisations are well down this road. There is a
need to transfer negative welfare benefit spending into
267. Audrey Young, Waitangi ‘Nerve’ Must Endure: Treaty Minister, N.Z. HERALD,
Oct. 8, 1999, at A5.
268. Courage is Priority for Treaty Pact, SUN. STAR TIMES, Oct. 3, 1999, at A10.
269. ROUND, supra note 12, at 25.
270. WALTER CHRISTIE, A RACE APART 233 (1998).
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more positive policies built around improving the skills of
Maori, and making sure that they participate in economic
271
growth and prosperity.
Maori also express concern with the Treaty settlement process.
Some believe they need to rely on themselves rather than the
272
while others simply have no faith in the process at all.
Treaty,
Cherryl Waerea-i-te-rangi Smith has transformed a Mohawk piece
on ways to scalp an Indian into “Twenty-one Ways to Take Away
Treaty Rights” which include: make the Maori a non-person
(convince them their ancestors were savages, that they are violent,
or make them wards of the state); convince Maori to be patient;
make Maori believe that things are being done for their own good;
insist that Maori “go through the proper channels”; set up a
pretend court with no powers; play one iwi off another; and talk
273
about what’s good for everyone.
New Zealanders who have not lost faith, also express a range of
responses. There are those who are equally adamant about the
need to maintain the Treaty process:
Pakeha critics of the Treaty argue that parliamentary
democracy and the rule of law are . . . sufficient for
[peaceful co-existence]. Maori will reply that this is simply
a recipe for the tyranny of the majority . . . The history of
New Zealand land law would serve to prove them right . . .
New Zealand is fortunate to have a founding statement of
principles . . . by which the relations of Maori and Pakeha
274
can be mediated . . . .
And there are those, such as Taonui, that claim not enough is
being done:
There is a paradox when some New Zealanders, while
attesting a sense of justice and protesting affordability
return, cloaked in apologies, less than 2% of the lands
unjustly taken from Maori, continue to enjoy the benefits
275
they derive from the 98% they retain.
Yet Taonui and others also express encouragement:

271. Spoonley, supra note 104.
272. Angela Gregory, Maori Must Have Own Economy, Says Leader, N.Z. HERALD,
July 30, 1999, at A14.
273. Cherryl Waerea-i-te-rangi Smith, Twenty-one Ways to Take Away Treaty
Rights, in 1 THE FISCAL ENVELOPE: ECONOMICS, POLITICS & COLONISATION 30-32
(1995).
274. WARD, supra note 74, at 2.
275. Taonui, supra note 139.
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The treaty is an ongoing relationship . . . . It is nearly 160
years since the treaty was signed. We are not 15 years into
that process of investigating losses, making reparations
and, most importantly, determining how we can share the
future. We need maturity, courage and patience in order
276
to persevere.
While some express hope:
The treaty is, of course, a legal contract. But it is also a
statement of hope, a symbol of partnership, a
commitment made by representatives of two different
peoples to try to work together . . . [to] become one
nation. Like South Africa’s ‘Truth and Reconciliation
Commission,’ the . . . . Tribunal is a forum within which
wounds from our past can be healed and new
partnerships forged . . . this will occur only if we . . . look
honestly at personal prejudices, cultural differences and
structural racism, as well as individual grievances. . . .
And some even joy. “In ten years we’ll look back and ask
277
ourselves why we didn’t . . . unleash all this energy before . . . .”
In the end, the reality of the Treaty process is what is made of
it. Unfortunately, the Treaty is not the only context in which Maori
must contend for justice.
C. Neo-Liberal Economic Reform
1. The Reform
The evidence was clear that, with the onset of structural
adjustment, the colonial legacy of poverty, dispossession
and alienation that had operated since 1840 had taken
278
another, equally pernicious, form.
— Jane Kelsey, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Auckland.
In 1984, heralded by Sir Roger Douglas, the traditionally social
democratic Labour party unilaterally and cavalierly undertook the
“New Zealand Experiment”—a pure neo-liberal economic reform.
The National government continued “Rogernomics” with even

276.
277.
278.

Taonui, supra note 103.
MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 89.
KELSEY, supra note 200, at 285.
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279

greater fervor after 1990.
By 1999, the fundamentals of the
reform were entrenched: market liberalization and free trade,
limited government, a narrow monetarist policy, a deregulated
280
labor market, and fiscal restraint.
The reform continued,
281
and a
notwithstanding economic and social consequences
prevailing view among New Zealanders that the theory behind it
282
was morally and ethically bankrupt. Writes Kelsey, “There was no
room for putting altruism ahead of self-interest, compassion ahead
of efficiency, or mutual obligations and collective identity ahead of
individual benefit. Nor was there any doubt about the intrinsic
283
superiority of the market-place.”
As a result, the economic character of the country changed
radically. In the private sector, the successive Governments
removed subsidies, ceased regulating the number of competitors,
set about dismantling import protection, and exposed sheltered
industries to global markets. In the public sector, they transformed
post and electricity into state-owned enterprises, trimmed railways
for sale, and lifted the freeze from prices, wages, interest rates and
dividends. The financial sector was deregulated and the dollar
284
floated, farm subsidies wiped out, and public debts exposed.
Increasing foreign control required Maori resources to be sold
285
off while expanding Asian immigrant policies left largely poorer
286
and unemployed Maori even more marginalized.
The reform affected all other areas of New Zealand life as well.
In education, the Governments transferred administrative
responsibility to local school boards and, in order to reduce
government funding, forced tertiary institutions to respond to the
287
market—delivering private benefits to fee-paying students. More
288
profoundly, education was defined as a private good. As a result,
an elite student body emerged, under heavy pressure to recoup
costs of education, repay loans, and pursue careers rather than
279. Id. at 1.
280. Id. at 2.
281. Id. at 11.
282. Id. at 271.
283. Id. at 335.
284. John Roughan, Our First Steps into a Brave New World, N.Z. HERALD, July 14,
1999, at A14. In particular the debts of Think Big, a huge public investment that
gambled on 1970s oil prices, were exposed. Id.
285. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 342.
286. Id. at 340.
287. Id. at 4.
288. Id. at 328.
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vocations. Intellectual interests became luxuries. Market forces
served women, Maori and Pacific Island students the least and hit
289
them the hardest.
The Governments also cut back state expenditures “as the
universal welfare state gave way to a limited safety net founded on
the ‘fundamental principles’ of fairness, self-reliance, efficiency,
290
greater personal choices, realism, and change management.”
Michael Joseph Savage’s vision of the “welfare of the people” as the
nation’s “first and constant consideration,” which had placed the
economy at the service of social justice since the 1930s, was
291
Targeted assistance
superceded by a vision of the marketplace.
was easier to sell to the electorate than a universal welfare system,
despite the required threshold testing, monitoring, and
compliance checking. As former Prime Minister Jim Bolger put it,
“I am waiting for someone to provide moral justification, much less
economic justification, to tax people on modest incomes so as to
292
pay benefits to individuals or families who don’t need them.”
Consequently, the extent and amount of entitlement to
welfare benefits were pared back—even as those persons forced to
293
depend on them grew. Subsidized state housing was raised to full
market value with supplements available for tenants in public and
private rental accommodation or for homebuyers with strict
eligibility. Institutions for mentally ill, elderly, and young closed in
the name of community care, and churches and charities were
expected to cover government’s withdrawal from social and income

289. Id. at 329.
290. Id. at 272.
291. “The goal of New Zealand’s social security system, according to the Royal
Commission on Social Security in 1972 was to ensure within limitations . . . that
everyone is able to enjoy a standard of living much like that of the rest of the
community, and thus is able to feel a sense of participation in and belonging to the
community.” Id. at 271(quoting Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry, New
Zealand Today, Vol. 1 (April 1988)). Standards for a fair society also included:
dignity and self-determination; genuine opportunity for all people, of whatever
age, race, gender, social and economic position or abilities, to develop their own
potential; fair distribution of wealth and resource including access to the
resources; and acceptance of identity and cultures of different peoples. Id. at 27172(citing Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy, New Zealand Today,
Vol. 1 (April 1988)).
292. JONATHAN BOSTON & SUSAN ST. JOHN, Targeting versus Universality: Social
Assistance for All or Just for the Poor?, in REDESIGNING THE WELFARE STATE IN NEW
ZEALAND: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PROSPECTS 93, 93 (1999).
293. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 4.
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294

support.
Charity was compatible with the neo-liberal ethos,
enabling the rich to choose how much benevolence to bestow, and
295
on whom.
Kelsey also argues that an innate moralism and gender bias
pervaded these attacks on the welfare state. The Crown moved to
force “responsibility” back onto the family, attempted to normalize
monocultural, nuclear and patriarchal family, and displayed
296
indifference to widespread evidence of domestic violence. It also
297
adopted a new vocabulary that dehumanized the process.
As a
result,
[b]y 1995, after a decade of radical structural change,
New Zealand had become a highly unstable and polarized
society . . . What were once basic priorities—collective
responsibility, redistribution of resources and power,
social stability, democratic participation and the belief
that human beings were entitled to live and work in
security and dignity—seemed to have been left far
298
behind.
Nonetheless, the “New Zealand Experiment” was
299
internationally “praised for getting the fundamentals right.” But
did it, and at what cost?
2.

The Socio-economic Effects of the Reform

It is no coincidence that the biggest increases in income
inequalities have occurred in economies such as those of
America, Britain and New Zealand, where free-market
300
economic policies have been pursued most zealously.
— The Economist, 1994.
The purpose of the neo-liberal economic reform was to
increase growth and reduce poverty, neither of which occurred.
Prior to 1984, New Zealand’s real gross domestic product was very
294. Id. at 5.
295. Id. at 291.
296. Id. at 332.
297. Id. at 335. For example, “shedding workers” for lay-offs; “flexible wage
rates” for cutting wages; “broadening the tax base” for shifting burden from rich
to poor; and “incentives” for cutting benefits to force people into very low-paying
jobs. Id.
298. Id. at 350.
299. Paul Dalziel, Fifteen Years on and Economic Goals Remain Out of Reach, N.Z.
HERALD, July 14, 1999, at A15.
300. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 271, citing For Richer, For Poorer, THE ECONOMIST,
Nov. 5, 1994 at 19.
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close to that of Australia with annual growth rates of 2.7% and
2.9% respectively. Between 1984 and 1992, New Zealand’s real
output remained virtually static while Australia’s continued to grow
at 3% a year. After 1992, the annual growth rate recovered to
3.3%, yet still remained almost a full percentage point below that of
Australia at 4.2%. So while its economy showed some signs of
recovering, New Zealand slipped behind Australia, with an output
301
gap of $215 billion from 1984 to 1998.
At the same time, poverty levels grew dramatically, especially
after social welfare cuts in 1991. Ten percent of the population
increased their share of total income at the expense of the rest of
the country’s population, while the cut in the standard of living of
302
the bottom 10% was 8.7%.
The number estimated to be living
below the poverty line rose by at least 35% between 1989 and 1992;
303
“The issue
and by 1993 one in six persons was living in poverty.
of income distribution [had] simply been ignored,” comments
304
Kelsey.
Unfortunately, “Maori were the most marginal of the
marginalized. Having been systematically stripped of the resources
that guaranteed their economic, cultural and spiritual well-being,
305
Maori were reduced to an underclass in their own land.”
By late
1993, census figures indicated that in the ten years prior, the
proportion of Maori in the poorest 20% of the national population
had almost tripled, while the proportion of Pakeha among the
306
poor had actually decreased by about one fourth.
A dual society
was emerging and Maori were becoming an underclass with no
307
“vested interest in democracy . . . .”
This income gap was compounded by past social policies and
other pressures generated from a lack of attention to the culturally
308
specific needs of the Maori.
As predominantly unskilled labor,
Maori depended heavily on state employment. In the 1950s and
60s many iwis transferred resources in trust to the Crown in return
for jobs, expecting them to be returned.
The increased
301. Dalziel, supra note 299, at A15.
302. Id.
303. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 10.
304. Id. at 243.
305. Id. at 283.
306. WEBSTER, supra note 22, at 42.
307. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 296 (quoting Ian Shirley, Social Development
in New Zealand, Address at the Social Development Seminar (Aug. 5, 1999)).
308. Id. at 273.
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corporatization and privatization under the economic reform
allowed the Government to sell these resources, setting Maori adrift
and rendering them even more dependent on the state. Many
Maori were also mainstreamed into urban workshops for the
unskilled—lower paid employment in industries that had since
309
been massively downsized.
For this reason, unemployment and
310
benefit cuts hit Maori disproportionately hard.
By March 1992,
the unemployment rate for Maori, who comprised 8% of the labor
force, had reached 25.8% compared with an 8.1% rate for
311
Pakeha.
Families in poverty also faced charges for health care and
312
Devolution led to new
education, which were previously free.
forms of dependency on immediate families and voluntary
agencies, which—although sold as a means to “empower the
313
community”—were never properly funded.
The burden was
314
merely shifted from the state to primarily wahine “volunteers.”
The public symbol of this charity became the rise of the foodbank,
which experienced an astounding 1,117% increase between 1991
and 1993, serving disproportionate numbers of Maori and Pacific
315
Islanders.
The “short-sighted, cost-cutting mentality” of economic reform
316
also compromised Maori educational opportunities.
The
established link between socio-economic status, race, and
317
achievement was exacerbated by the increased inability of schools
in high poverty, non-Pakeha areas to provide for the needs of their
students. In 1994, “one in five secondary students was at risk of
failing school because of poverty, severe behavioral problems,
318
truancy, or abuse.”
Maori students and those in poor schools
309. LAIDLAW, supra note 11, at 161.
310. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 285.
311. Id. at 262. The rate for Pacific Islanders was 28.8%. Id.
312. Id. at 289.
313. Id. at 291.
314. Id. at 292.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 290.
317. NZ School Report: Could Try Harder, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 16, 1999, at A15
[hereinafter School Report]. A 1999 report showed that a quarter of students at lowdecile (poor area) schools did not sit for School Certificate (two steps below
bursary, which is required for university entrance), compared with 4% at highdecile schools. Id. “Of the lower-decile students who did sit, most got D or E
grades. Id. Boards of trustees in poorer areas tended to have less management
experience and educational standards were lower.” Id.
318. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 290.
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319

were even more likely to fail.
Teachers in predominantly Maori
320
schools were under rising stress, as the gap between wealthy and
321
poorer schools continued to grow.
The market model was
racially and economically polarizing education rather than creating
diversity. Teenagers from middle-class families in poor areas were
abandoning their local schools for those in wealthier areas. Over
half the low-decile (poor) secondary schools lost more than 10% of
322
their students after 1992.
319. School Report, supra note 317, at A15.
320. Bronwyn Sell, Job Puts Load on Maori Teachers, N.Z. HERALD, July 12, 1999,
at A16. A report completed for the Ministry of Education showed that Maori
secondary teachers are under stress, juggling teaching with looking after Maori
students and promoting Maori language. Id. Maori teachers work an average of
60 hours a week and one in five considered leaving, “citing stress, lack of support
and feeling undervalued.” Id.
321. Wayne Bainbridge, Poor Schools Could Lead to Permanent Underclass, N.Z.
HERALD, July 28, 1999, at A15. Equity payments to poorer school have failed. Id.
They were originally intended for economically disadvantaged areas (decile 1-4) to
try to balance the advantages of schools, but funding is now extended to up to
decile 9 schools. Id.
322. Bronwyn Sell, Cultural Shift Hurting Poorer Schools, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 16,
1999, at A12. These statistics come from a Ministry of Education report on the
class of 1998. Only 5% of secondary schools in wealthy areas had a similar loss
while half of them had grown more than 10%. Id. To remedy these shortcomings,
educational experts are calling for compensatory literacy intervention; homework
centers; parent education; and mentors. Wayne Bainbridge, Schools Alone Can’t
Solve Maori Underachievement, N.Z. HERALD, Nov.17, 1999, at A19; One-stop-schools
providing food, healthcare, social welfare services have also been recommended.
Catherine Masters, Call for One-Stop Schools: Feed-and-Succour Scheme Advocated, N.Z.
HERALD, Oct. 5, 1999, at A4. Others are calling for more culturally specific
structural reforms such as correct pronunciation of Maori names; family-friendly
meetings and programs; more Maori teachers and board members; Maori
language; art and music around the school; bilingual and immersion classes; and
high expectations. Only then will the system shift from treating Maori as a small
ethnic minority for whom a little provision must be made to true partners.
Charmaine Pountney, Too Many Barriers to Maori Learning, N.Z. HERALD, July 26,
1999, at A13. Still others call for a strengthening of the separate Maori schools
that already exist so as to escape a failed Western model of education. Maori See
Youngsters Being Schooled for Failure, N.Z. HERALD, June 25, 1999, at A9. Currently,
96% of Maori children go to mainstream schools. Id. In a 1999 report, the Maori
Education Commission, set up in 1997 to reduce the gap between Maori and nonMaori education, called for a separately funded Maori education entity rather than
continuing with initiatives that patch on to mainstream curriculums. Currently,
the education system is tightly legislated and takes a Western approach that
focuses on treating a “deficiency” in the child. Critics feel that a separate system is
not the answer. Richard Knight, Henare Supports Urgent Boost to Maori Education,
N.Z. HERALD, June 25, 1999, at A3. Nationwide, there are 770 kohanga reo
(preschools) and 50 total-immersion Maori language kura kaupapa (primary and
intermediate schools. Taonui, supra note 51 at A13. More must be done, however,
to meet the need for stable, two-parent, fully employed families with the economic
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Moreover, between 1994-1997, the number of secondary
students from poor schools going on to university dropped by 23%,
323
A
while the number from wealthy areas increased 25%.
University of Auckland study showed the link between the
economic status of the community from which a school draws its
students, and the likelihood students will go on to tertiary
education. According to Professor Dame Anne Salmond, “The gap
324
is widening at a frightening rate.”
Unless the trend is reversed,
New Zealand will be unable to produce the skilled population for
the knowledge-based economy upon which the reform is
dependent.
In fact, New Zealand is already behind other
developed countries in the percentage of persons with university
325
qualifications.
Studies also show that student loan debt created by applying
market forces to education disproportionately affected those from
poorer backgrounds. With fewer graduating, and those that do
graduating with lower-level qualifications, poorer students now
leave with less earning power and greater debt. Comments Rawiri
Taonui, “We run the danger of creating a class of unqualified and
heavily indebted former students. Rather than breaking down old
326
barriers, we are creating new ones.”
Housing conditions were also negatively affected by the
reform. High market rents for urban state housing—although a
false economy—contributed to overcrowding and the spread of
327
infectious diseases, which are expensive to treat. In 1999, almost
75% of people living in crowded homes were Maori or Pacific
328
Islander. The market rents that low-income persons were forced
to pay for substandard housing, showed the Government’s lack of

resources to provide good health care, books, and language experiences. Wayne
Bainbridge, Schools Alone Can’t Solve Maori Underachievement, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 17,
1999, at A19.
323. Theresa Garner, Fewer Poor, More Rich Going on to University, N.Z. HERALD,
Sept. 18-19, 1999, at A4. There have been overall gains in Maori tertiary
enrollments and graduates, however. For example, the number of graduates rose
from 400 to nearly 1,600 from 1990 to 1996. Rawiri Taonui, Poor Students Borrow
More, N.Z. HERALD, Nov. 25, 1999, at A21.
324. Garner, supra note 323.
325. Id.
326. Taonui, supra note 323.
327. Martin Johnston, State Housing Rents “Bad for Health”, N.Z. HERALD, July
28, 1999, at A20.
328. Paul Yandall, Accusations Fly Over Housing Woes, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 4-5,
1999, at A10.
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concern for the urban poor. As one Labour party MP describing
South Auckland put it, “What they’ve done is abandoned the poor
329
here. They’ve abandoned them and are now ghettoizing them.”
Substandard rural housing—sometimes in the form of overcrowded
caravans, garages, and even cars—also contributed to serious
health threats. The Northland, for example, had the second
highest rate of meningococcal meningitis in the nation in 1999,
and some of the highest infection rates for other third world
330
diseases such as tuberculosis, rheumatic fever and hepatitis A.
Health problems deepened among Maori in other ways as well:
331
lower immunization rates, poorer
lower life expectancies,
nutrition, and higher incidences of preventable injury,
332
333
hospitalization,
and child death.
Troubling social conditions
334
335
also resulted in higher rates of suicide, family breakdowns,
336
337
domestic violence, and child abuse. An economy of drugs and
338
339
crime prospered
and violent crime skyrocketed,
especially
329. Little Change in Shoddy Flats, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 4-5, 1999, at A10.
330. Ken Lewis, Housing Shame for Poor Rural Families, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 14,
1999, at A8.
331. Maori Rate Cuts Life Expectancy, N.Z. HERALD, July 13, 1999, at A10.
According to 1996 data, Maori lived eight to nine years less than non-Maori. Id.
332. Children Dying on Our Doorstep, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 16-17, 1999, at A5.
“Nearly half of children in South Auckland live in areas considered among the
most deprived in New Zealand.” Id.
333. Danya Levy, Child Death Toll Disgraces Nation, N.Z. HERALD, June 8, 1999, at
A11. “New Zealand’s rate of 34 deaths per 100,000 people, is the highest of all the
countries in the study.” Id. Lower-income families are at higher risk. Id.
334. Martin Johnston, Suicide Up to Levels of 1930s Bad Years, N.Z. HERALD, Sept.
8, 1999, at A3. “One New Zealander commits suicide every 16 hours on average
about 540 a year.” Id. Male suicides rose 119% between 1974 and 1994, mostly in
the 15 to 24 age range and among the unemployed. Id. Twelve and one-half
percent were Maori, 81% of whom were male. Id.
335. Deborah Diaz, Where Families Fail, N.Z. HERALD, July 17-18, 1999, at A6.
336. Andrew Stone and Jan Corbett, One Woman in Five Hit at Home, N.Z.
HERALD, Aug. 24, 1999, at A1. One in three Maori report being victims of physical
domestic violence. “At 32.3% the rate is more than twice that reported by Pacific
Islanders or Pakeha.” Id.
337. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 293.
338. Id. at 294. Said one New Zealander, “In a country once renowned for a
low crime-rate, where doors were never locked, children could walk alone to
school and roam freely through parks and where old people could rely on
neighbors for help rather than having to bar the doors and windows against them,
something fundamental has changed.” Jan Corbett et al., A People at War with
Themselves, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 21-22, 1999, at A15.
339. Corbett et al., supra note 338, at A15. “According to figures from the
British Home Office, New Zealand is now the most violent country in the
developed world, leaving aside South Africa.” Id. There were 1,121 violent crimes
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340

among young Maori and Pacific Island males.
Despite this, the
341
Crown continued to cut back on legal aid.
Kelsey quotes a feature story in England’s newspaper
Independent to capture the full effect:
[t]here is the feeling that something irreplaceable has
already been lost. For 40 years, New Zealand tried to
build a civil society in which all its people were free from
fear or want. That project has now lapsed. In its place is
only a vague exhortation for individuals to go and get
342
rich.
It is no wonder that there has been sustained Maori resistance
to the economic reform. Devolution actually strengthened the
revival of the iwi base and the emergence of urban Maori activists,
343
It became
resulting in increased demands for rangatiratanga.
evident however, that “ . . . lasting settlements would not be
achieved by negotiating with an elite of Maori entrepreneurs and
imposing market economic models on Maori economic
344
development.”
Nor would it be achieved by Crown demands for
a “self-reliance and self-responsibility that could only be obtained
345
on Pakeha terms . . . by assimilation . . . .”
3. The Alternatives to the Reform
The critical question in New Zealand was whether those
Pakeha who now found themselves victims of the neoliberal regime would continue to side with the state and
international capital against Maori, or whether enough
would change sides and seek out a complementary vision
346
and strategy for the future.
— Jane Kelsey
Despite the entrenched nature of the neo-liberal economic
per 100,000 compared with 861 for Australia and 610 for U.S. Most were assaults.
Id.
340. Jan Corbett, Why Do Maori Go Wrong?, N.Z. HERALD, Aug. 25, 1999, at A13.
Although only 15% of population, Maori men account for 35% of the arrests for
violence. Id. This was down from 45% in 1995. Id. Pacific Islanders make up
almost 5% of population and 15% of violent offences. Id.
341. Naomi Larkin, Lawyers Angry at Legal Aid Cuts, N.Z. HERALD, Oct. 5, 1999,
at A1.
342. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 8.
343. Id. at 319.
344. Id. at 320.
345. LAIDLAW, supra note 11, at 161.
346. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 347.
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reforms, Kelsey and others believe there are alternatives. Opinion
polls taken during the 1990s indicate that the majority of New
Zealanders support greater public expenditure in areas such as
347
education and health care in place of tax cuts.
Because
economic policy “should reflect the values people want to live by,”
argues Kelly, it should incorporate concepts like cooperation,
348
loyalty and reciprocity.
She proposes a “gentler combination of
liberalization with managed mixed economy, welfare state, and
corporatist labor policy.” She also urges the adoption of a
community economic model that values family, household and
volunteer work and that allows people “to genuinely participate in
349
the economic decision that affect their lives.”
Rob Cooper, in a paper prepared for the Maori Council of
Churches, describes true Maori economic development in similar
terms. Rejecting individualism and self-interest, he calls for an
integrated and harmonious balance of socio-economic factors that
advance Maori life according to their own values of reciprocity,
enduring collective responsibility, and a binding spiritual
relationship with each other and with nature.
He desires
restoration of Maori lands and access to the benefits of Western
knowledge and technology for adaptation according to Maori
350
ways.
Manuka Henare, Senior Lecturer in Maori Business
Development agrees, emphasizing a Maori worldview that includes
ethics of te ao marama (wholeness); mauri (vitalism); hua (obligatory
reciprocity in relationships and economics), whanau (extended
family), tika (justice), kotahitanga (solidarity); kaitiakitanga
351
(guardianship of creation), and wairuatanga (spirituality).
From
these ethics, argues Henare, an economy of affection could
352
emerge.
To assure their economic survival, the Crown has urged Maori
to develop visionary business leadership, resourcefulness and
347. A Farewell to Welfare, N.Z. HERALD, March 27-28, 1999, at J5. St. John and
Boston argue that denying people adequate income support in face of
overwhelming economic and social trends “is unjust and inefficient. As a matter
of urgency, social welfare benefits must be restored to a level that removes the
need for food-banks and other charities to meet . . . basic living standards.”
BOSTON & ST. JOHN, supra note 292, at 316.
348. KELSEY, supra note 200, at 358-59.
349. Id. at 363.
350. Id. at 364.
351. Manuka Henare, Sustainable Social Policy, in REDESIGNING THE WELFARE
STATE IN NEW ZEALAND: PROBLEMS, POLICIES, PROSPECTS 39, 40 (1999).
352. Id.
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cooperation—perhaps by recognizing the skills of younger,
353
Other strategies have emerged from economic
educated Maori.
summits and national hui (meetings) such as establishing a
354
separate Maori economy and treasury.
This approach, however,
would leave Pakeha privilege untouched and fail to unite the
nation.
III. PATTERNS AND IMPLICATIONS
Tutira mai nga iwi,
Tatou, tatou e;
Tutira mai nga iwi,
Tatou, tatou e.
Whaia te maramatanga,
Me te aroha,
E nga iwi,
Kia tapa tahi,
Kai kotahi ra,
Tatou, tatou e.

Stand forth, people,
Let us unite;
Come forth, people
Let us be one.
Seek for enlightenment,
And for love,
All people,
Work together,
Unite together,
355
Let us be one.

Several organizing patterns emerge as I reflect on Maori
experience(s) and apply them to our nation: the need for us to
adopt a de-essentialized and relational approach to building our
own multiracial democracy, and the need for us to take action—
structural action—to actually build this democracy.
A. De-essentializing
Webster reminds us that an essentialized approach to
achieving equality will fail. Just as many New Zealanders—Maori
and non-Maori alike—envelope themselves in an illusory
celebration of the Maori way of life, many Americans stand behind
what we are convinced is a diverse, yet color-blind society. By
featuring our nation’s racial and ethnic diversity and by claiming to
have eliminated any personal animus towards communities of
color, we have, in effect, essentialized our own civil rights

353. Richard Knight, Maori “Lack Visionary Leaders”, N.Z. HERALD, May 18,
1999, at A6.
354. Gregory, supra note 272. This separatist suggestion came from the Tai
Tokerau Economic Development Summit in Waitangi on July 29, 1999. Id.
355. HIWI TAUROA & PAT TAUROA, TE MARAE: A GUIDE TO CUSTOMS &
PROTOCOL 71 (1986).
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movement, rendering it incapable of fostering a collective struggle
for structural change. Although we have, like the New Zealanders,
undergone a conversion of sorts since the 1960s, it has developed
into a narcissistic one that masks the ways in which our society
continues to perpetuate inequality—the ways in which our society is
anything but color-blind. As Leonard Steinhorn and Barbara
Diggs-Brown argue, “our professed attitudes, symbols, and public
expressions masquerade as integrated when our lives clearly are
356
not.”
Coupled with poverty-entrenching neo-liberal economic
reforms of our own, we have lost our direction. Jerome Scott and
Walda Katz-Fishman describe our situation and what it will take to
fight our way out of it in the following way:
The enduring reality of race coupled with the deepening
357
polarization of wealth and poverty suggests that the civil
rights reforms . . . did not transform the fundamental
economic and political structures of American society . . . .
The reactionary polices of neo-liberalism have come
home with the 1996 law eliminating welfare “as we knew
358
it”; reversal of the civil rights gains of the reform era; the
mushrooming prison-industrial complex; anti-immigrant
legislation; and attacks on job security, public education
and public housing, health care and the environment . . .
All of this makes possible a new politics of equality that
challenges the hierarchies of capitalist domination
comprehensively . . . Such a politics challenges not only
racism (and sexism), but the system of global capitalism in
which they are embedded and which makes the condition
of poverty for the many a condition for the creation of
359
wealth for a few.
Diversity and color-blindness are not the only notions we
essentialize in the United States.
Returning a moment to
356. Leonard Steinhorn & Barbara Diggs-Brown, By the Color of Our Skin: The
Illusion of Integration and the Reality of Race, POVERTY & RACE, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 1,3.
John O. Calmore argues further that even this masquerade is fading, as “whites
become more comfortable with the segregated status quo.” Viable Integration Must
Reject the Ideology of “Assimilationism”, POVERTY & RACE, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 7.
357. See generally, DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) for a
description of how race and poverty intersect in our construction of the American
ghetto.
358. See The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (PRWORA), 42 U.S.C. 607 (Supp.III 1997).
359. Jerome Scott & Walda Katz-Fishman, The Politics of Equality, POVERTY &
RACE, Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 5,6.
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Meredith’s discussion of the Maori subject, we can recall the
danger involved in reducing identity to essential racial categories—
“Maori”, “Pakeha”, “black”, “Hispanic”, “Native American”, “white”
etc. Regardless of the fact that no one subject is unitary, static, or
ahistorical, and that race is socially constructed, we use these
categories in an essentialist way to carry on our discourse and do
our politics. Rather than liberating, race winds up further masking
360
issues of economic inequality and powerlessness. In the process,
Meredith warns, we “ghettoize” our subject’s potentialities and
possibilities and back ourselves into a political corner where a
361
plurality of subjects would suit us better. A recent New York Times
editorial captures the fallacy of essentializing Native Americans this
way:
It is hard to imagine more potent symbols of the
American West than Native Americans and bison, so
much so that it is almost always easier to see the history
and the myths they evoke than it is to see the present-day
reality. Native Americans are not, in fact, repopulating the
Great Plains as a whole. In the Plains states, with few
exceptions, Native American numbers are growing almost
exclusively on the reservations, which are still plagued
with deep poverty, social fragmentation and chronic
illness of a kind more commonly seen among the urban
362
poor.
We also tend to essentialize black-white tensions just as New
Zealand does Maori-Pakeha ones. In doing so, we ignore “the
profoundly different relationships” other communities of color
363
have with the current majority and with blacks.
This binary
framework weakens solidarity, deprives one group of the benefits of
the others’ experiences, and fosters over-identification with
364
whites.
While New Zealand must address bi- and multi360. LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A
NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 309 (1998).
361. MEREDITH, supra note 64.
362. Unsettled Plains, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, § 4 at 16.
363. Steinhorn & Diggs-Brown, supra note 356, at 5.
364. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell’s Toolkit—Fit to Dismantle that Famous House,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 295-96 (2000); see also Carrie Lynn H. Okizaki, “What are
You:” Hapa-Girl and Multiracial Identity, 71 U. COL. L. REV. 463, 480-482 (2000);
Deborah Ramirez, Forging a Latino Identity, 9 LA RAZA L. J. 61, 63 (1996); Francisco
Valdes, Latina/o Ethnicities, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics in Postmodern
Legal Culture: From Practices to Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L. J. 1, 15(1996); Robert S.
Chang, Facing History, Facing Ourselves: Eric Yamamoto and the Quest for Justice, 5
MICH. J. RACE & L. 111, 129 (1999)(reviewing ERIC YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL
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culturalism, we must determine the extent to which the black-white
paradigm remains useful in a multiracial society. If we continue to
essentialize race we hinder our ability to acknowledge that all
365
groups have been racialized in unique ways.
Rather, our
employment of racial categories must be more multiple,
366
intersectional, recombinational, tentative and fluid.
In other words, we need to de-esssentialize our racial notions.
This can be done, argues Meredith, by developing a critical
consciousness. With such a consciousness we can challenge our
own romantic—or not so romantic—notions of the nation’s many
racial and ethnic subjects. We can also then place the experiences
of communities of color in their proper contexts as historically
evolving, relational, changing in meaning, and “to be interpreted
in terms of time and place”—as I have attempted to do with Maori
367
experiences here.
Once we examine how race is socially
constructed and how we share so many other selves in common,
the racial “Other” can become part of us and we part of them. The
idea, notes Peter Edelman, is to focus “more on what people have
in common than on what differentiates them”—to unify rather
368
than divide.
Developing this consciousness can also keep us
humble, says Meredith, as we realize that our position is no more
369
unique than that of others.
De-essentializing the way we think of the racial “Other” can
have monumental implications for the way we think, talk and do
politics. It can help us unmask our nation’s grave racial and
JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1998)).
365. ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
154 (1998). As one Native American scholar put it: “To the Indian people it has
seemed quite unfair that churches and government agencies concentrated their
efforts primarily on the blacks. By defining the problem as one of race and
making race refer solely to blacks, Indians were systematically excluded from
consideration.” VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS 168 (1969).
366. See John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause
Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space, and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927,
1949 (1999)(citing EDWARD W. SOJA, THIRDSPACE: JOURNEYS TO LOS ANGELES AND
OTHER REAL-AND-IMAGINED PLACES 22-23 (1996) for a discussion of how cause
lawyers should consider a critical strategy of “thirding-as-Othering” in an attempt
“to open up our spatial imaginaries to ways of thinking and acting politically that
respond to all binarisms, to any attempt to confine thought and political action to
only two alternatives, by interjecting an-Other set of choices”).
367. Calmore, supra note 366, at 1928 (citing Michael B. Katz, The Urban
“Underclass” as a Metaphor of Social Transformation, in THE “UNDERCLASS” DEBATE:
VIEWS FROM HISTORY 3, 23 (1993)).
368. PETER EDELMAN, SEARCHING FOR AMERICA’S HEART 179 (2001).
369. Meredith, supra note 64, at 14.
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economic inequalities and disturb its powerful assimilative
processes—processes that designate everything white (and male) as
normal, unmarked, and innocent. Our failure to racially integrate
our schools, for example, is largely reflective of our inability or
unwillingness to eliminate the structures within them—and within
the larger community—that perpetuate segregation, concentrate
poverty and assimilate all students into an essential whiteness. Our
recent welfare reforms do the same things—they ignore the
systemic barriers facing persons of color trying to get off the rolls
and they moralize the racial “Other” into a monocultural lifestyle.
These dehumanizing experiences are common to the Maori as well.
Learning to de-essentialize can also foster rangatiratanga. In
our case, we need to think not only in terms of Native American
sovereignty, but in terms of self-determination for all classes, races
and ethnicities. Recognizing our multiplicity can help us achieve
what Maori and non-Maori might find themselves achieving
someday as well: overlapping sovereignties, rather then hegemony.
This will require voting reforms like those in New Zealand that
move beyond our “first-past-the post” and “winner-takes-all” system
370
(which in every aspect is driven by essentialism), and that curb
371
discriminatory ballot initiatives and referenda.
This will also
require the de-essentializing of the debate over the meaning of our
own foundational documents and civil rights legislation. Just as the
Treaty of Waitanga is in the process of “becoming” to all citizens,
so must our Constitution, especially in the context of achieving
substantive equality. As Meredith puts it, traditions must not
remain fixed and ahistorical, but must justify and re-invent
372
themselves in face of a multiplicity of identities.
By de-essentializing, we can also avoid the either-or, dualistic
approach to our discourse and politics that so often results in the
triumph of the yell and the victory of the powerful. None of our
views, none of our policies can be as “black” or “white” as we make
them out to be. As Meredith argues, “We need an understanding
of [every] debate that is more open ended and sophisticated, that
emphasizes the ambiguities of the relations, the uncertainty of

370. See generally, GUINIER, supra note 360, at 156 (advocating cumulative
voting in the United States, which allows “any self-defined minority group to vote
strategically to gain representation.”).
371. See Becky Kruse, The Truth in Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot Proposition
Ads Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 129 (2001).
372. Meredith, supra note 64, at 14.
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373

tradition and the multiplicity of identities . . . .”
The tensions
between our various racial, sexual and economic selves—just like
the tensions between urban and iwi Maori, male Moari and Maori
wahine—need renegotiating in a multi-dimensional, strategic
fashion that serves the needs of all citizens as well as acknowledges
persistent structural inequalities.
This means avoiding a singularly claims-based, litigative
approach to furthering the cause, which Coates and McHugh argue
has not suited Maori well. Such an approach provides only an
illusory sense of closure. Take, for example, affirmative action in
higher education in the United States. In our effort to retain racial
diversity as a legitimate goal in admissions policies, rather than
confine ourselves to responding to litigation (which in every aspect
is also driven by essentialism) we can attempt a discourse that
opens us up to the “Other” involved. Such a discourse can help us
discover what it is we share in common that we want to achieve and
how it is we can go about achieving it. If we can see less of a
monopoly of “merit” on one side or the other, and focus instead on
the “student” and the “citizen who desires to contribute as an
educated professional” that we find in each other, we may be able
to reach agreement on how to act more inclusively and effectively.
We may also be able to overcome the color-blind mentality that
underpins recent anti-affirmative action rulings. This would
further enable us to uncover and deconstruct unitary white
privilege and to rediscover the multiple significance of race that
has, as Rumbles describes it in the case of “Maoriness”, been
removed from the table. Then, perhaps, remedial bridging—like
the courses being offered at the University of Auckland medical
school—and “bridging” in the larger relational sense can proceed.
B. Engaging in Relational Politics
Which brings us to the second organizing pattern: our need to
engage in relational politics as a productive source of social
transformation—“where neither self nor other, we nor them, take
374
precedence.”
As is obvious from what was just stated, to speak
about de-essentializing is to speak about relationship.
Each of us is constituted by the Other; we cannot
deliberate or decide without implicating Otherness. We
373.
374.

Meredith, supra note 64, at 20.
Meredith, supra note 64, at 15.
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are ‘Maori’ in relation to those who are ‘non-Maori’, we
are ‘urban Maori’ in relation to those who are ‘tribal
Maori’, we are ‘Maori men’ in relation to those who are
‘Maori women’ and so forth. To dismiss the other is to
375
dismiss the self.
A relational approach, says Meredith, will demand that we
negotiate, collaborate, compromise, and sacrifice.
Forming
“relationships of citizenship” is what he calls it. Creating a “beloved
376
community” is what Martin Luther King, Jr., called it.
As the
founder of the new Madison Society for Law and Policy, Professor
Peter J. Rubin, argues, we need to reemphasize legal values such as
compassion, equality and respect for human dignity, values that
“have largely been read out of American law through the
ascendancy of various strands of legal thought over the last 20
377
years.” Senator Paul Wellstone also argues that we need to “make
a place for all Americans at the decision-making table,” especially
378
those that face major economic and social challenges.
From what I observed, the interactions that are the least
relational in post-economic reform New Zealand are not those
between Maori and Pakeha, or between urban and iwi Maori, but
between the Crown and all citizens.
Compassion, mutual
obligations, and collective identity, observed Kelsey, are now
missing. This then “trickles down” to the interactions between
citizens themselves, pitting those with opportunity against those
without—even on an international level. A recent letter to the
editor in the St. Paul Pioneer Press captures this anti-relational
approach to economic policy, democracy building, and citizenship
in the United States quite tersely:
The primary role of government in [our] free democratic
republic . . . is to create an environment that gives the
individual equality of opportunity to succeed in life. With
375.
376.

Id. at 15.
Facing the Challenge of a New Age, in MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., I HAVE A
DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 22 (James M.
Washington, ed. Harper San Francisco 1982)(1957).
377. Crystal Nix Hines, Young Liberal Law Group Is Expanding, N.Y. TIMES, June
1, 2001, at A17. The Society hopes to become the competitor to the highly
influential and conservative Federalist Society. Its first chapter, organized in 1999
at Georgetown Law School, has 125-150 members and chapters will open the Fall
of 2001 at a dozen law schools including Harvard, Columbia, University of
Southern California, University of North Carolina, George Washington University
and New York University.
378. PAUL WELLSTONE, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 206 (2001).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001

59

09_FINAL.SPENCER 08.31.01.DOC

314

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 10
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

9/7/2001 11:55 AM

[Vol. 28:1

this freedom comes the individual responsibility to take
the necessary steps to make the opportunity a reality. If a
person does not take advantage of a free public
education, gets a criminal record, develops no job skills
. . . this is not the fault of the taxpayers . . . The question
then arises is this: should the contributing citizen pay the
bill for those whose own failures led to whatever problems
they might have? In other words should we trade in
freedom of opportunity and the chance of individual
success for the welfare state? I would hold that overtaxing
the winners to build a welfare state for the losers is much
more irresponsible than returning to the productive
379
taxpayer a portion of his/her earnings.
Are we all “essentially” winners or losers, as this writer suggests?
Is there no room for finding commonality? And within this
commonality, compassion? Must we persist in employing hyperindividualized rights talk without reference to mutual obligations
380
and responsibilities? Can we find no room for reconciliation and
redemption?
C. Taking Structural Action
Because such a view is so exacerbating to the cause, it might
help now to turn to the last organizing pattern that emerges: taking
action to affect structural change. The most powerful symbol of
this pattern—and it is meant to inspire—is the urban Maori.
Generally speaking, Maori (as multiple-selves, of course) inspire
action because they embrace a “whole way of struggle” rather than
just a “whole way of life.” Urban Maori, in particular, inspire action
because
by refusing accommodation within existing institutions
and hegemonic arrangements, they [seek] to expand the
boundaries of belonging and in effect have emerged as
‘new citizens’ . . . [and] as political subjects, in what
Cornel West . . . terms a process of “new self-perception,
in which persons no longer view themselves as objects of
history, but rather as subjects of history, willing to put
their own selves and bodies to reconstruct a new nation.”
Urban Maori, like so many other social movements, have
379. Miland Lathrop, Government’s True Role, ST. PAUL PIONEER. PRESS, May 21,
2001, at 9A.
380. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991).
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. . . thus imagined and set out to shape their vision of
Maori society, as they create space to live it, claim rights
and entitlements for it, and through their own daily life
practices construct and perform it . . . . [They] have
offered a potential for reordering, restructuring and
381
renewal. . . .
As the global economy becomes more and more diversified, we
will find ourselves like the urban Maori, without whanau or iwi or
homeland, struggling to find new forms of community. Martin
Luther King Jr. put it this way: “[o]ur world is geographically one.
382
Now we are faced with the challenge of making it spiritually one.”
In order to affect this transformation, we will need to resist being
essentialized, avoid essentializng others and retain each other’s
dignity. We will also need to reorder, restructure, and renew the
economic order, the racial order and all other colonizing,
dehumanizing frontiers. This will require coalition building and
direct action. It will also require the courage that Maori exhibit to
put our whole selves into the struggle.
We can draw further inspiration from the structural changes
that in 1992 went into creating an equal partnership between
Maori and non-Maori members of the Anglican Church in New
Zealand. After a multicultural commission researched the Treaty
of Waitangi and reported back to the synod, the Church rewrote its
constitution, recognizing the Treaty partnership originally
envisaged in 1840. The rights of Maori and Pakeha to control their
affairs were ensured in context of an ongoing relationship with the
other ecclesiastical partners. The new Church now has three
cultural streams known as Tikanga: the Pakeha Church, the Maori
Church (Te Pihopatanga o Aotearoa) and the diocese of Polynesia,
383
all with implicit obligations to each other.
Writes Anglican
theologian Jenny Te Paa of the changes:
The new structure has made Pakeha aware of their Treaty
obligations and more open to examining issues of
historical injustice . . . . For Maori it is like being set free! .
. . . We rejoice in our ability to control events . . . . I am
not aware of any other organization where the
constitution and rules governing an institution have been
changed in this way . . . [b]ecause the prospect of

381.
382.
383.

Meredith, supra note 64, at 14.
Facing the Challenge of a New Age, in KING, JR., supra note 376, at 19.
MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 169.
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changing existing arrangements is too untenable . . . .
[This] model is being widely perceived as having
enormous potential for other institutional settings. It’s
384
being talked about as a model for government.
Structural changes within our nation—like those undertaken
by the Anglican Church in New Zealand—are imperative. Many of
our laws and institutions, although not explicitly racist, disempower
persons and communities of color by perpetuating discriminatory
385
conditions.
Entire systems produce policies and repeated
patterns of behavior that undermine our ability to create a
386
multiracial democracy.
We must ferret out these racist laws,
institutions, policies, and practices and transform them. Maori
values such as wholeness, mutual obligation, stewardship and
spirituality can help us achieve this transformation.
As we wrestle with our own growing racial diversity and
division, our own living history of colonization and injustice, and
our own amoral, market-driven, global economy, we should
embrace Maori experience(s) and allow them to inform and
empower our cause.

384. MELBOURNE, supra note 10, at 170-71.
385. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, 449, 449-50 (1995).
386. Take, for example, law enforcement. Tactics endorsed in the “war on
drugs,” such as pretextual stops, have become “paths” followed by the
organizational actors. While law enforcement agents deny that they are racist in
targeting persons of color in traffic stops, racial profiling occurs nonetheless and is
a manifestation of institutional racism.
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